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ABSTRACT 
The United States has been plagued with a deadlocked, “do 
nothing” Congress for the last several years, but today there is a new 
game in town. Senator Chris Dodd declared, when he first 
encountered the full force of e-legislating, “It’s a new day [in 
Washington] . . . . Brace yourselves.”1 Digital technologies have 
fundamentally changed the relationship of citizens to their 
governments. Since e-democracy was first identified in the 1990s, at 
least four subcategories have emerged. This article debuts the newest 
member of the e-democracy family: e-legislating—the use of the 
Internet and social media to influence federal legislation. 
The federal legislative process has traditionally been remote for the 
average citizen. E-legislating attempts to change that dynamic 
through the use of electronic media campaigns to influence legislators 
between election cycles. Yet, fundamental problems with the process 
exist and were illustrated by the use of e-legislating to protest the Stop 
Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in January 2012. One negative outcome 
was manipulation of the public through emotional, multi-sensory 
messages that may have resulted in impulse-based decision-making. 
Another was a lack of accountability for the citizens who 
anonymously contacted legislators to influence their votes or who 
submitted multiple electronic messages regarding the Act. In addition, 
the SOPA Internet blackout raised a troubling, but perhaps unique 
concern: SOPA opponents were able to use deprivation to coerce 
political action. Participating websites deprived citizens of their 
	
1 Jonathan Weisman, In Fight Over Piracy Bills, New Economy Rises Against Old, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/technology/web-protests 
-piracy-bill-and-2-key-senators-change-course.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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services and were able to divert the users’ newfound time into 
activism in favor of the SOPA opponents. 
E-legislating has awe-inspiring potential to empower common 
citizens and to result in the creation of positive laws that reflect a 
balance of the will of common citizens with the influence of lobbyists 
in Congress. However, citizens participating in e-legislating need to 
be aware that the process can be both obstructive as well as 
constructive. 
INTRODUCTION 
n June 6, 2010, twenty-eight-year-old Khaled Mohamed Said 
was savagely beaten to death by two officers of Egypt’s secret 
police. Two days later, the “Kullena Khaled Said” Facebook page was 
launched with the message, “We Are All Khaled.”2 That webpage 
gave birth to “Revolution 2.0,”3 which then went on to achieve 
something previously considered impossible: it changed the 
leadership of Egypt after thirty years of dominance by Hosni 
Mubarak.4 
The United States is experiencing a similar, if less bloody, Internet-
based revolution. On November 6, 2012, the Presidential campaign 
for Barack Obama rallied voters with a powerful online presence. 
Project Narwhal, as it was called, was a sophisticated data platform 
that gave the Obama campaign an edge in its ability to socially 
connect with, and then mobilize, Obama supporters to get to the 
polls.5 “Narwhal unified what Obama for America knew about voters, 
	
2 WAEL GHONIM, REVOLUTION 2.0: THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE IS GREATER THAN 
THE PEOPLE IN POWER: A MEMOIR 59–60 (2012). 
3 GHONIM, supra note 2. 
4 Mubarak, the fourth president of Egypt who served from 1981 to 2011, was ousted 
after 18 days of coordinated demonstrations in January and February of 2011. On February 
11, 2011, Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that Mubarak had resigned as 
president and transferred authority to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. David D. 
Kirkpatrick et al., Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html. Ghonim 
and other Internet activists set the ball rolling with a call to hundreds of thousands of 
Egyptians to “take to the streets” on January 25, 2011. GHONIM, supra note 2, at 139. 
China, recognizing the potential threats from electronic media organizing, allows "vitriolic 
criticism" on the Internet but actively censors "[a]ny attempt to [motivate] collective 
action." Shankar Vedantam, It’s OK to Protest in China, Just don’t March (Sept. 9, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/09/09/219721983/its-ok-to-protest-in      
-china-just-dont-march. 
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canvassers, event-goers, and phone-bankers, and it did it in real 
time.”6 The Romney campaign’s answer to Narwhal, Project Orca (its 
name chosen because orcas are the only known predators of 
narwhals), crashed on Election Day.7 “Mr. Obama’s information 
technology infrastructure was viewed as state-of-the-art exemplary, 
whereas everyone from Republican volunteers to Silicon Valley 
journalists have criticized . . . Mr. Romney’s get-out-the-vote 
application, . . . widely viewed as having failed on Election Day          
. . . .”8 
Highly sophisticated, technologically-assisted activism campaigns 
now target government and private actors on a daily basis and have 
fundamentally altered the way many decisions are being made.9 The 
ouster of Mubarak in Egypt10 and President Obama’s reelection 
illustrate one key area of e-democracy11—the powerful role of the 
	
6 Madrigal, supra note 5. 
7 Nate Silver, In Silicon Valley, Technology Talent Gap Threatens G.O.P. Campaigns, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2012, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/28/in            
-silicon-valley-technology-talent-gap-threatens-g-o-p-campaigns/. 
8 Silver, supra note 7. 
9 Social media campaigns target both public and private actors. For example, 
Change.org states, “With hundreds of people winning campaigns on Change.org, the pace 
of change is growing unbelievably quickly. Have something you want to change? Click 
here to start your own petition—and we bet you’ll find that you’re more powerful than you 
ever imagined.” The GroundHog, Our Voice Still Matters, GROUNDUP (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://groundupct.wordpress.com/2012/02/15/our-voice-still-matters/. The site has 
collected millions of petition signatures spanning a vast array of topics. 
10 Revolution 2.0 was successful in ousting Hosni Mubarak. Whether Egypt can 
become a successful and peaceful democracy remains to be seen as unrest continues, such 
as the November 2012 riots in response to Morsi’s power grab. See, e.g., David D. 
Kirkpatrick, Morsi Defends Wide Authority as Turmoil Rises in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/07/world/middleeast/egypt-islamists-secular     
-opponents-clashes.html?pagewanted=all. But some argue we need to be patient because 
“democracy in some parts of the world doesn’t look anything like ours.” Greg Dobbs, 
Dobbs: We’re Witnessing the Passage to Democracy in Egypt, DENVER POST (Feb. 1, 
2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/opinion/ci_22493067/dobbs-were               
-witnessing-passage-democracy-egypt. 
11 E-democracy has been defined as “the use of [electronic] information and 
communication technologies to engage citizens, support the democratic decision-making 
processes and strengthen representative democracy.” Ann Macintosh, Characterizing E-
Participation in Policy-Making, in Proceedings of the 37th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences 1–2 (2004), available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc 
/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan038449.pdf. 
 E-democracy is distinguishable from e-government, which refers to “[t]he delivery of 
online public services.” William H. Dutton & Malcolm Peltu, Oxford Internet Inst., 
Reconfiguring Government–Public Engagements: Enhancing the Communicative Power 
of Citizens 1, 8 (2007), available at http://people.oii.ox.ac.uk/dutton/wp-content/uploads 
/2007/04/FD9.pdf. 
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Internet in choosing leaders. Other e-democracy processes have been 
discussed in the literature.12 This article, for the first time, identifies 
and focuses on another form of e-democracy that is just now 
emerging: “e-legislating.”13 
In his second inaugural address, President Obama noted: 
You and I, as citizens, have the power to set this country’s course. 
You and I, as citizens, have the obligation to shape the debates of 
our time—not only with the votes we cast, but with the voices we 
lift in defense of our most ancient values and enduring ideals.14 
The message is not new. Many democratic leaders have opined that 
they cannot make change without the support of the people. For 
example, Franklin Delano Roosevelt is famously credited with saying, 
“I agree with you, I want to do it, now make me do it.”15 Obama 
supporters have been frustrated by his inability to implement the 
change his campaign promised. However, our legislative process 
requires action not just from the executive branch, but from Congress 
as well, to enact laws. And sadly, the 112th Congress has gained the 
dubious reputation of being “the most unproductive session since the 
	
12 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
13 This Article applies the “e-legislating” label for the phenomenon described here. The 
term has not been otherwise adopted within e-democracy discussions. However, the 
European Union (EU) has recognized a similar phenomenon which they label 
“eParticipation.” A 2010 report describes the process as actions by the European 
Parliament to “enhanc[e] the participation of citizens and contribut[e] to better legislation 
and policy-making.” Thanassis Chrissafis & Mechthild Rohen, European eParticipation 
Developments, 2 EJOURNAL EDEMOCRACY & OPEN GOV’T 89, 91 (2010), 
www.jedem.org/article/download/44/35. This process is being initiated through formal 
actions by the EU government, and thus is distinguishable from e-democracy, which is an 
effort from the grassroots up. Other authors are also advocating citizen participation in 
policy-making in the EU–a concept closer to e-democracy as applied here in the U.S. 
context. See, e.g., Paul Johnston, Transforming Government’s Policy-Making Processes, 2 
EJOURNAL EDEMOCRACY & OPEN GOV’T 162 (2010), http://www.jedem.org/article/view 
/43/44 (arguing for more sustained citizen engagement in the policy process); Günther 
Schefbeck, Electronic Support for the Legislative Consultation Process: Theoretical 
Concepts and Practical Requirements, 2 EJOURNAL EDEMOCRACY & OPEN GOV’T 28 
(2010), http://www.jedem.org/article/view/20 (suggesting new electronic tools could 
facilitate citizen involvement). 
14 Barack Obama, President of the United States, 2013 Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 
2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/21 
/transcript-president-obama-2013-inaugural-address/. 
15 Tim Price, Keeping Them Honest: What Politicians Say vs. What We Make Them Do, 
NEXT NEW DEAL (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/price-point/keeping-them  
-honest-what-politicians-say-vs-what-we-make-them-do. 
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1940s.”16 As a long-time believer in the power of community 
organizing, President Obama has adopted an electronic community 
answer to Congress’s inaction: e-legislating. In a message to his 
followers the day he renewed his oath of office, President Obama 
explicitly stated how he hopes citizens will exert their power—
through “Organizing for Action,” a continuation of his election 
campaign Internet presence to organize “our grassroots movement” to 
impact legislation that “will be crucial to finishing what we started.”17 
Through the “Organizing for Action” website, President Obama 
also distinguished citizen roles in elections as opposed to that role in 
legislating: “Winning an election won’t bring about the change we 
seek. It’s simply the chance to make that change.”18 His words 
emphasize that, even at the highest levels of government, those who 
have gained power are now asking people to join in this new type of 
e-democracy to “make them” enact transformative laws through e-
legislating. 
This Article identifies and critiques the phenomenon of e-
legislating. Part I provides the backstory of e-democracy—how it is 
viewed and how it has been used in contexts other than legislating. 
Part II sets out what e-legislating is and how citizen input in this 
context is distinct from traditional law-making processes in the 
United States. In Part III, the five key attributes of e-legislating will 
be explored, and Part IV will illustrate how these attributes played out 
in a recent e-legislating situation. The conclusion highlights the 
promise and potential for abuse unleashed by this newest tool for 
shaping our democracy. 
I 
E-DEMOCRACY 
The United States, and the world, is at a flexpoint. The expansion 
of electronic communication, especially social networking and 
interactive media,19 is fundamentally changing the relationship of 
	
16 Amanda Terkel, 112th Congress Set To Become Most Unproductive Since 1940s, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/28 
/congress-unproductive_n_2371387.html. 
17 E-mail from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to author (Jan. 21, 2013, 
06:15 PM MST) (on file with author). 
18 Video: Michele Obama on Organizing for Action: You In?, https://my.barackobama 
.com/page/s/organizing-for-action (last visited June 30, 2013). 
19 The Internet has no monolithic form. This Article focuses on the overall phenomenon 
of electronic communication rather than any particular platform. Consequently, the 
references here are meant to embrace all forms of electronic communication, active and 
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people to their governments. “[The] government no longer has a 
monopoly on creating systems for citizen participation. Individuals 
and groups are realizing their own online communicative power to 
reconfigure their engagements with government and enhance their 
capacity to work with others on issues of common interest.”20 
E-democracy has been defined as the “use of information and 
communications technologies and strategies by ‘democratic sectors’ 
within the political processes.”21 As the concept of e-democracy has 
evolved over time, recognizable subcategories have emerged. 
Specifically, for purposes of this article, we will address e-
electioneering, e-government, e-rulemaking, and e-judicial advocacy. 
But first, a discussion of the backstory is necessary. 
A. The Internet 
The story of the Internet starts our story of e-democracy. The 
World Wide Web was invented in 1990, and user participation in 
viewing websites and exchanging email grew dramatically in the 
following decades.22 At first, people saw the potential of the Internet 
to widely disseminate information and to expedite personal 
communications through email. Soon, however, the Internet’s 
interactive potential began to unfold. 
The introduction of social media such as Facebook in 200423 and 
Twitter in 200624 brought the communicative powers of the Internet 
to a higher level with the ability to rapidly reach a mind-numbing 
number of followers.25 This second, more interactive phase is known 
	
passive, including e-mail, social networking (e.g., Facebook), user-generated content (e.g., 
YouTube or blogs), mash-ups (e.g., Overmixter), citizen journalism (e.g., OhMyNews), 
information searching and retrieval (e.g., Google, Yahoo, Bing), or collaborative 
production (e.g., Wikipedia). Some have labeled these “Web 2.0 application types.” 
DUTTON & PELTU, supra note 11, at 6. 
20 DUTTON & PELTU, supra note 11, at 8–9. 
21 Steven Clift, E-Democracy, E-Governance and Public Net-Work, PUBLICUS.NET 
(Sept. 2003), http://www.publicus.net/articles/edempublicnetwork.html. 
22 See K.G. COFFMAN & A.M. ODLYZKO, AT&T LABS–RES., GROWTH OF THE 
INTERNET (2001), available at http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/oft.internet.growth 
.pdf; ASA BRIGGS & PETER BURKE, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MEDIA: FROM 
GUTENBERG TO THE INTERNET (3d ed. 2010). 
23 Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and 
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 212 (2008). 
24 Boyd & Ellison, supra note 23, at 212. 
25 In early 2013, President Obama had over 21 million followers on Twitter, and Justin 
Bieber had 29 million. Leslie A. Gordon, A Huge Following? Twitter Suit Accuses 
Businesses of Selling Followers, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 2013, at 10. 
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as Web 2.0.26 With this 2.0 labeling, Silicon Valley suggested it was 
just “a new version of some old software.”27 But Web 2.0’s ability to 
bring “together the small contributions of millions of people and 
mak[e] them matter . . . [is] really a revolution.”28 
It wasn’t long before scholars recognized that e-democracy had the 
potential to dramatically change the face of democracy worldwide. 
Initially, scholars found the “bottom-up style of the Internet” to be 
“unqualifiedly praiseworthy.”29 But about a decade after its inception, 
a “second generation of scholarship on the Internet” became more 
critical and encouraged regulation.30 One of the leading voices for 
regulation was Cass Sunstein in his book Republic.com.31 Sunstein 
was especially concerned with the negative impact of the Internet on 
democracy and free speech.32 Yet, the role of social media continues 
to grow in our society, and it is unlikely that any significant 
restrictions will be placed upon the Internet’s ability to provide a 
political soapbox for all. 
As with citizen initiatives, discussed in Part II.C below, that genie 
is out of the bottle,33 and no one anticipates a reversal. For example, 
an increasing number of Americans are using the Internet to interact 
with government. A 2010 study found that eighty-two percent of 
American Internet users (representing sixty-one percent of all adults 
in the country) accessed or received government services online.34 
	
26 Lev Grossman, You–Yes, You–Are TIME’s Person of the Year, TIME, Dec. 25, 2006, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1570810,00.html. 
27 Grossman, supra note 26. 
28 Grossman, supra note 26. 
29 Thomas S. Ulen, Democracy on the Line: A Review of Republic.com by Cass 
Sunstein, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL’Y 317, 318 (2001) (book review) (citing David 
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1367 (1996)). 
30 Ulen, supra note 29, at 318. 
31 CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (Princeton Univ. Press 2001). 
32 Sunstein suggested reforms to address the ability of the Internet to filter information 
and to create “cybercascades” of like-minded thinkers. In his subsequent book, 
REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, Sunstein further documents the ”information cocoons” and “echo 
chambers” he fears have enflamed hate groups. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2009). In both books, Sunstein proposes reforms to recognize the 
positive potential of the Internet on deliberative democracy. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM, 
supra note 31; SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, supra. 
33 K.K. DuVivier, Out of the Bottle: The Genie of Direct Democracy, 70 ALB. L. REV. 
1045 (2007). 
34 Aaron Smith, Government Online: The Internet Gives Citizens New Paths to 
Government Services and Information, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 2, 10 
(Apr. 27, 2010), http://pewInternet.org/Reports/2010/Government-Online.aspx [hereinafter 
Government Online]. 
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Nearly a quarter of those went “online to communicate directly with 
government agencies and participate in the online debate over 
government issues and policies.”35 
A 2012 study reinforced the notion of the social network as “the 
new public square”36 when it reported that sixty-six percent of 
Americans who use social media, such as Facebook and Twitter,—or 
thirty-nine percent of all American adults—have used those sites for 
civic or political activities.37 “Minds are not changed in streets and 
parks as they once were. To an increasing degree, the more significant 
interchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness occur in 
mass and electronic media.”38 The question now is what the impacts 
will be. 
B. Forms of E-democracy 
At least four subsets of e-democracy have emerged since its early 
stages: e-electioneering, e-government, e-rulemaking, and e-judicial 
advocacy. While social media groups now solicit citizen input during 
each of these stages, such input is arguably more appropriate at one 
end of the spectrum—i.e., voting in elections—and less appropriate at 
the other—i.e., attempting to allow citizen opinion to influence the 
objective legal basis for a judicial decision. 
First, “e-electioneering,” or the role of digital technologies in 
electing politicians,39 is illustrated by the Obama campaign story 
	
35 Government Online, supra note 34, at 31. 
36 Bill Sherman, Your Mayor, Your “Friend”: Public Officials, Social Networking, and 
the Unmapped New Public Square, 31 PACE L. REV. 95, 102–03 (2011). 
37 Lee Rainie, Aaron Smith, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady & Sidney Verba, 
Social Media and Political Engagement, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 2 
(Oct. 19, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Political-engagement.aspx; see also 
Lee Rainie & Aaron Smith, Politics on Social Networking Sites, PEW INTERNET & 
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Sept. 4, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Politics-on 
-SNS.aspx. 
38 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 802–03 
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737 (1990) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). But see United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 206 
(2003) (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998)) 
(rejecting the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic 
confines). 
39 See, e.g., Jim Macnamara & Gail Kenning, E-electioneering 2010: Trends in Social 
Media Use in Australian Political Communication, ACADEMIA.EDU (2011), 
http://www.academia.edu/830297/E-electioneering_2010_Trends_in_Social_Media_Use 
_in_Australian_Political_Communication; Austl. Ctr. for Pub. Commc’n, E-
Electioneering: Use of New Media in the 2007 Australian Federal Election, UNIV. OF 
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above. As our democracy envisions and demands active citizen 
participation at the voting stage, the use of electronic mediums to 
promote election activities was a logical first stage for e-democracy. 
Second, the term “e-government” has been employed to describe 
the use of electronic resources in delivering government services, 
primarily in the realm of administrative agencies.  The Electronic 
Government Act of 200240 created security standards and uniform 
confidentiality safeguards for information technology activities by 
federal agencies. In his signing statement, President George W. Bush 
stated, “The Act will also assist in expanding the use of the Internet 
and computer resources in order to deliver Government services . . . 
for a citizen-centered, results-oriented, and market-based 
Government.”41 The goals of the Act include: 
Promot[ing] [the] use of the Internet and other information 
technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen 
participation in Government[;] 
Mak[ing] the Federal Government more transparent and 
accountable[;] [and] 
Provid[ing] enhanced access to Government information and 
services . . . .42 
As budgets allowed, states also have embraced Internet and 
computer resources. Similar to the federal use of e-government, the 
states’ goals initially were for one-way communication of information 
from a government to its citizens.43 Early evaluations confirm that 
these sites have primarily been used to provide information rather 
than for promoting debate or shaping policy.44 
	
TECH. SYDNEY (2008), http://www.fass.uts.edu.au/communication/centres/acpc/docs/e-
electioneering-research-report-online.pdf. 
40 Electronic Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002). 
41 George W. Bush, Presidential Statement, E-GOV, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/egov/g-3-statement.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). 
42 Electronic Government Act § 2(b)(2), (9), (11). 
43 See, e.g., Clift, supra note 21 (using the term “representative e-government” to 
“describe the e-democracy activities of government institutions”). Clift urges use of 
electronic mediums to increase consultation online and increase accountability and 
transparency. His explanation talks of shifting from a traditional model of (1) occasional 
input from citizens between elections; (2) power in the governance infrastructure centered 
with political leaders who determine broad policy priorities; and (3) government directly 
or through publicly-funded organizations implementing the policy agenda and law. 
44 Paul Ferber, Franz Foltz & Rudy Pugliese, Cyberdemocracy and Online Politics: A 
New Model of Interactivity, 27 BULL. SCI., TECH & SOC’Y 391 (2007), available at 
http://bst.sagepub.com/content/27/5/391.abstract. 
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The third is “e-rulemaking,” the subset of e-democracy that has 
perhaps received the most scholarly attention.45 The “notice and 
comment” process in administrative rulemaking anticipates and 
mandates public input. Some have argued that rulemaking represents 
our government’s “most transparent and participatory decision-
making process,”46 promising to “enlarge significantly a genuine 
public sphere in which individual citizens participate directly” in 
governmental decision-making.47 Furthermore, a 2008 ABA report 
concluded that “comment activity on regulations.gov has been 
increasing at a very encouraging rate.”48 
However, tensions have arisen about appropriate agency responses 
to public input through the e-rulemaking process. As an example, in 
2003, the National Park Service finalized a rule allowing the use of jet 
skis in two limited areas of the Assateague National Seashore.49 
	
45 See David Schlosberg et al., Deliberation in E-Rulemaking? The Problem of Mass 
Participation, in ONLINE DELIBERATION: DESIGN, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 133 (Todd 
Davies & Seeta Peña Gangadharan eds., 2009); COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS AND FUTURE 
OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ACHIEVING THE 
POTENTIAL: THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING (A REPORT TO CONGRESS AND 
THE PRESIDENT) (2008), available at http://ceri.law.cornell.edu/documents/report-web      
-version.pdf [hereinafter ABA E-RULEMAKING REPORT]; Stuart Minor Benjamin, 
Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 
893 (2006); Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and 
Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943 (2006); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory 
Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411 (2005); Cynthia R. Farina, Mary Newhart & Josiah 
Heidt, Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation That 
Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 123 (2012) [hereinafter Rulemaking vs. 
Democracy]; Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395 (2011); 
Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: Social Networking and 
Public Participation in Rulemaking, 31 PACE L. REV. 382 (2011) [hereinafter Rulemaking 
in 140 Characters]; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking 
Process—for Better or Worse, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 469 (2008) [hereinafter 
Transformation]; Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of Email, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343 (2011); Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in 
Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433 (2004); Peter M. Shane, Turning Gold into EPG: Lessons 
from Low-Tech Democratic Experimentalism for Electronic Rulemaking and Other 
Ventures in Cyberdemocracy, 1 I/S J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 147 (2005); Stuart W. 
Shulman, The Case Against Mass E-mails: Perverse Incentives and Low Quality Public 
Participation in U.S. Federal Rulemaking, 1 POL’Y & INTERNET 23, 29, apps. C, E, G, K 
(2009)); Stuart W. Shulman, Whither Deliberation? Mass E-Mail Campaigns and U.S. 
Regulatory Rulemaking, 3 J. E-GOV’T 41 (2006); Stephen Zavestoski, Stuart W. Shulman 
& David Schlosberg, Democracy and the Environment on the Internet: Electronic Citizen 
Participation in Regulatory Rulemaking, 31 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 383 (2006). 
46 Farina, Rulemaking 2.0, supra note 45, at 402. 
47 Shane, supra note 45, at 148. 
48 ABA E-RULEMAKING REPORT, supra note 45, at 13. 
49 Assateague Island National Seashore, Personal Watercraft Use, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,371, 
32,372 (May 30, 2003). 
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During the comment period, the Park Service received 7600 
comments on the proposed rule. Only 170 of those comments favored 
allowing the jet skis. Over ninety-five percent (7264 comments) 
supported a complete ban on jet skis in the area.50 In spite of the vast 
proportion of comments supporting a ban, the Park Service passed the 
rule anyway.51 The agency specifically addressed eight public 
comments, but did not incorporate any suggested changes into the 
final rule.52 
Was the Park Service obligated to take into account the majority’s 
opposition to allowing jet skis, which was expressed by so many of 
the public comments? What was the point of soliciting these public 
comments if the agency ignored the input? Should the agency 
response be different in an administrative e-rulemaking context where 
the goal is informed and objective decision-making? How does this 
context differ from the voice of the people in the e-electioneering 
context, which legitimizes every citizen’s vote regardless of the 
motivation or lack of education about the candidates or their 
positions? Part III below will flush out these issues further and make a 
case for treating citizen input through e-legislating somewhere 
between e-electioneering and e-rulemaking participation. 
“E-judicial advocacy” is the last alternative subcategory of e-
democracy identified here. In a society that is accustomed to 
weighing in electronically on just about everything, from which 
contestants will win on American Idol or Dancing with the Stars53 to 
which Thanksgiving turkeys the President should pardon each year,54 
it is not surprising that Americans are now seeking to use e-




52 Mendelson, supra note 45, at 1364 (concluding that the agency did not address any 
of the comments in opposition). Mendelson included this and other stories as evidence that 
agencies do not consider “value-based” input. Id. 
53 Daniel Blake, American Idol 2012 Winner is Phillip Phillips After Record 132M 
Votes, THE CHRISTIAN POST (May 23, 2012, 10:01 PM), http://global.christianpost.com 
/news/american-idol-2012-winner-is-phillip-phillips-after-record-132-million-votes-754 
59/; Gayle Falkenthal, Winner of the 2012 Dancing with the Stars All-Stars Mirror Ball 
Trophy Is. . . , WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2012, http://communities.washingtontimes.com 
/neighborhood/tv-den/2012/nov/27/winner-2012-dancing-stars-champion-melissa-won/. 
54 Megan Slack, President Obama Pardons Cobbler, the National Thanksgiving 
Turkey, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Nov. 21, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov 
/blog/2012/11/21/president-obama-pardons-cobbler-national-thanksgiving-turkey. 
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American citizens and interest groups sought to influence the 
Court’s 2012 health care decision.55 One hundred and thirty-six 
organizations, an unofficial record, filed amicus briefs with the 
Court.56 Many other advocates sought to convey their opinions about 
the health care law in less official ways, such as rallies on the 
courthouse steps,57 rants on cable news,58 open letters to the Court,59 
and even regular mail to the Supreme Court.60 However, the largest 
campaigns were those driven by social media. 
Interest groups used the Internet to rally both Obamacare 
supporters and opponents to contact the Justices. The petitions they 
compiled and delivered attempted to persuade Justices Thomas and 
Kagan to recuse themselves from hearing the health care case. Over 
100,000 petition signatures were submitted to Justice Thomas and 
95,000 to Justice Kagan.61 
Other groups tried to influence the decision itself. One such group, 
FreedomWorks, claims to have gathered over 200,000 online 
	
55 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
56 Greg Stohr, Record Number of Amicus Briefs Filed in Health Care Cases, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2012, 10:55PM), http://go.bloomberg.com/health-care-supreme     
-court/2012-03-15/record-number-of-amicus-briefs-filed-in-health-care-cases/. This record 
number reflects the extraordinary public interest in the health care decision, but is also 
consistent with the historical trend of increasing use of amicus briefs. From 1946 to 1955, 
amicus briefs were filed in twenty-three percent of argued cases. By the 2011–2012 term, 
that number rose to ninety-five percent. Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, The 
Supreme Court’s Reliance on Amicus Curiae in the 2011–12 Term, NAT’L L.J., (Sept. 24, 
2012), available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/Arnold&Porter 
LLP.TheNationalLawJournal.092412.pdf. 
57 Ian Duncan, Supporters, Opponents Rally Outside Court Before Healthcare Ruling, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (June 28, 2012, 9:59 AM), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012   
-06-28/news/la-pn-supporters-opponents-congregate-outside-court-as-healthcare-ruling     
-nears-20120628_1_healthcare-law-oral-arguments-demonstrators. 
58 E.g., Sean Hannity, Health Care Reform is “The Most Irresponsible Piece of 
Domestic Legislation in Our Lifetime” (Fox News television broadcast Mar. 21, 2010), 
http://mediamatters.org/video/2010/03/21/hannity-health-care-reform-is-the-most-irrespon 
/162009. 
59 E.g., Jen Sorensen, An Open Letter to the Supreme Court About Health Insurance, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 1, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/cartoons/2012 
/june/open-letter-to-supreme-court-cartoon.aspx. 
60 Contact Us, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov 
/contact/contactus.aspx (last visited July 6, 2013). The Justices do not have email 
addresses at which the public can reach them. 
61 Mike Sacks, Clarence Thomas Petitioned By 100,000 Progressives to Recuse 
Himself from Health Care Cases, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2012, 12:27 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/17/clarence-thomas-petition-recuse-health-care 
_n_1284610.html; Tell Elena Kagan: “Recuse Yourself from ObamaCare Court Case,” 
GRASSFIRE NATION, (last visited July 6, 2013), http://www.grassfire.com/161/petition.asp. 
DUVIVIER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2013  12:07 PM 
22 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 9 
signatures for a health care repeal petition that it delivered to the 
Supreme Court after the close of oral arguments.62 The group implied 
that, thanks to widespread support of its members, it was on the verge 
of persuading Justice Kennedy to strike down the law.63 
Justice Kennedy did indeed vote against the Constitutionality of the 
healthcare law, though no evidence exists to support a theory that he 
was at all moved by petitions or other public pressure.64 The lack of 
hard evidence on the efficacy of lobbying judges, however, has not 
stopped people from attempting to use social media to control judicial 
outcomes.65 
The experiences with each of these alternative forms of e-
democracy provide guidance for explaining the distinguishing 
characteristics of e-legislating in Part III below. But first, Part II 
describes e-legislating and puts it within the context of the traditional 
process of making federal laws in the United States. 
II 
CITIZEN INPUT INTO FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
In contrast to other subsets of e-democracy described in Part I, this 
Article focuses on the newest member of the e-democracy family: e-
legislating. E-legislating represents a step beyond these other forms of 
e-democracy in that it involves an effort to use electronic mediums to 
influence actual statutory lawmaking. To provide context for this new 
form of e-democracy, this section will examine the historic role of 
U.S. citizens in creating legislation, describing first the federal 
legislative process itself, next the right to petition, and then the citizen 
initiative. Finally, Part II.D concludes with a discussion of the 
transition of the Obama campaign into Organizing for Action to 
illustrate e-legislating as a strategy for permitting citizens to have 
meaningful input in the critical stage of law creation. 
	
62 Matt Kibbe, Obama’s Mandate is Doomed, FREEDOMWORKS (Mar. 29, 2012), 
http://www.freedomworks.org/blog/mkibbe/obamas-mandate-is-doomed. 
63 Kibbe, supra note 62. 
64 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
65 E.g., Petition U.S. Supreme Court for Gay Rights, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook 
.com/PetitionUsSupremeCourtForGayRights (last visited July 6, 2013); Zaid Jilani, 20,000 
United Republic Members Petition Supreme Court to Overturn Citizens United, REPUBLIC 
REPORT (June 8, 2012), http://www.republicreport.org/2012/20000-united-republic            
-members-petition-supreme-court-overturn-citizens-united/. 
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A. Constitutional Limitations 
As the creators of one of the first modern democracies, our 
Founders struggled to find the proper balance for citizen 
participation.66 They were skeptical of giving citizens direct power to 
make laws or even vote in many cases because of the failures of 
democracy in ancient Greece.67 James Madison noted in Federalist 
No. 10 that a “pure democracy” or “a society consisting of a small 
number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in 
person” was defective because it offered no cure for “the mischiefs of 
faction.”68 The result, concluded Madison, was chaos: “[S]uch 
democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; 
have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the 
rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as 
they have been violent in their deaths.”69 
As a result of these concerns, the Founders consciously created a 
“republican form of government,”70 which limited the popular vote 
	
66 As one scholar has noted, “Government by the people represents the maximum, as 
government for the people represents the minimum of the democratic process.” THOMAS 
GOEBEL, A GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 1890–
1940, at 1 (2007) (citing T.V. Smith, The Voice of the People, 169 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 101, 109 (1933)) (emphasis added). 
67 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 25 (James Madison) (Doubleday & Co. 2d ed., 
1966) (“Being subjects either of an absolute or limited monarchy, [some celebrated 
authors] have endeavored to heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils of those forms, 
by placing in comparison the vices and defects of the republican, and by citing as 
specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy. 
Under the confusion of names, it has been an easy task to transfer to a republic 
observations applicable to a democracy only; and among others, the observation that it can 
never be established but among a small number of people, living within a small compass 
of territory.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 16 (James Madison) (Doubleday & 
Co. 2d ed., 1966) (“The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public 
councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have 
everywhere perished . . . .”); id. at 20 (“From this view of the subject it may be concluded 
that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, 
who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the 
mischiefs of faction.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Doubleday 
& Co. 2d ed., 1966) (“Where the whole power of the government is in the hands of the 
people, there is the less pretense for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional 
distempers of the State.”). 
68 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). 
69 Id. 
70 Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution requires that, “The United States shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect 
each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive 
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.” U.S. CONST. art. 
IV, § 4. 
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only to election of members of the House of Representatives.71 For 
over a century, U.S. citizens had no direct voice in electing their 
senators.72 The President was, and still is, chosen through an Electoral 
College, selected by state representatives rather than the people 
directly.73 
The process of enacting legislation created further distance 
between the people and their laws. First, the electorate was limited to 
an elite cadre of property owners.74 Second, as noted above, this 
	
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in 
each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch 
of the State Legislature.”). 
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XVII (“The Senate of 
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the 
Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.”). Note how this 
changed in 1913 with the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for the popular 
election of Senators: 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each 
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have 
one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for 
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
73 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. This portion of the Constitution provides: 
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a 
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives 
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United 
States, shall be appointed an Elector. 
Id. For the first nine elections, between the years 1789 and 1820, there was no popular 
vote at all for the President. Historical Election Results: Electoral College Box Scores 
1789–1996, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/federal         
-register/electoral-college/scores.html (last visited July 6, 2013). With the exception of 
four elections, the candidate with the most popular votes or the most Electoral College 
votes has won the Presidency. The Electoral College, SOCIAL STUDIES FOR KIDS, 
http://www.socialstudiesforkids.com/articles/government/theelectoralcollege.htm (last 
visited July 6, 2013). In the 1800 election, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr received 
equal numbers of Electoral College votes, and Jefferson won the election by a vote in the 
House of Representatives. Id. In the election of 1824, Andrew Jackson received the most 
electoral votes of any candidate. Id. He did not receive the required number of electoral 
votes to win, however. Id. A House of Representatives vote decided the election in favor 
of John Quincy Adams. Id. In the 1876 election, Samuel Tilden initially won a greater 
number of electoral votes, but a Congressional commission awarded Rutherford B. Hayes 
twenty disputed electoral votes, giving Hayes the 185 votes necessary at the time to win 
the election. Id. Most recently, in 2000, George W. Bush won the presidential election by 
carrying the Electoral College, even though his opponent Al Gore won the popular vote by 
more than 500,000 ballots. David Stout, The Final Tally: Gore’s Lead in the Popular Vote 
Now Exceeds 500,000, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2000, at A11. 
74 The franchise to vote has also been expanded. Initially, the vote was “reserved to 
white English-speaking literate males, a majority of whom belonged to the respectable 
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limited electorate only voted for members of the House of 
Representatives. Under the Constitution, the House had no power to 
implement laws unilaterally. All enactments required approval of the 
Senate and the signature of the President, neither elected directly by 
the people. In sum, while a few were allowed to vote in elections, no 
citizen had a direct vote in the legislative process. This structure was 
intentional to encourage a “deliberative democracy” 75: 
[The Senate] may be sometimes necessary as a defense to the 
people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the 
cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all 
governments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimately 
prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments 
in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular 
passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful 
misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which 
they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and 
condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the 
interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in 
order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow 
mediated by the people against themselves, until reason, justice, and 
truth can regain their authority over the public mind?76 
While the system of checks and balances was appealing to the 
Founders, to others they “were directed at perpetuating unequal social 
and political relations by frustrating the efforts of the people to 
	
classes.” ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 316 (2000). It now includes most citizens over 
eighteen years of age including females, minorities, and representatives of all economic 
groups. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (declaring all natural born and naturalized 
persons in United States to be citizens, prohibiting states from abridging citizens’ 
privileges or denying to any citizens equal protection of the laws, and penalizing states’ 
representation level in Congress if states deny voting rights to any male citizen twenty-one 
or older); id. amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting denial or abridgement of voting rights “on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”); id. amend. XIX (prohibiting 
denial or abridgement of voting rights “on account of sex”); id. amend. XXVI, § 1 
(prohibiting denial or abridgement of voting rights of citizens eighteen or older “on 
account of age”). Some variation exists from state to state about the eligibility of felons to 
vote. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1942–
49 (2002) (indicating that, as of date of article, eight states permanently disenfranchised all 
felons absent gubernatorial pardon or restoration order, five states permanently 
disenfranchised large categories of felons, thirty-five states had regimes varying based on 
number and severity of offenses, and two allowed convicts to vote while incarcerated). 
75 JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY & 
AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1997); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
76 THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005), available at 
http://constitution.org/fed/federa63.htm. 
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liberate themselves from the dominance of particular interests.”77 A 
similar desire to upset the status quo of power that prevents 
progressive change also drives many current supporters of e-
legislating. 
B. The Petition Clause 
While our Founders established a governing process that remains 
less democratic than many of its contemporary counterparts around 
the world,78 early citizens of the United States still enjoyed more 
power to directly influence legislative decisions than we do today. 
These early citizens could participate in federal lawmaking through a 
robust use of the Petition Clause. 
The Petition Clause is not in the body of the Constitution itself, but 
it appears in the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights. It guarantees 
citizens the right “to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.”79 The Petition Clause echoed the English Bill of Rights 
of 1689,80 which had its origins in chapter sixty-one of the Magna 
Carta.81 
As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he right to petition 
allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their 
government and their elected representatives.”82 It includes any non-
violent method of encouraging or disapproving of actions by any of 
the three branches of government, including related departments such 
as administrative agencies.83 Traditionally, the process for exercising 
one’s rights under the Clause involved writing letters or gathering 
multiple signatures on a petition. 
In England and colonial America, “petitions were a major source 
for legislative initiatives.”84 Petitioning “enjoyed its apex in America” 
	
77 GOEBEL, supra note 66, at 54 (2007). 
78 K.K. DuVivier, The United States as a Democratic Ideal? International Lessons in 
Referendum Democracy, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 821, 823 (2006). 
79 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
80 “[I]t is the right of the subjects to petition the king, and all commitments and 
prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.” 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2 (1689). 
81 “[I]f we, our justiciary, our bailiffs, or any of our officers, shall in any circumstance 
fail in the performance of them, towards any person, . . . the said four barons shall repair to 
us, or our justiciary, if we are out of the realm, and, laying open the grievance, shall 
petition to have it redressed without delay . . . .” MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61 (1215). 
82 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2495 (2011). 
83 Cal. Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972). 
84 Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 
739, 750 (1999). The petitioning process “originated more bills in pre-constitutional 
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in the late eighteenth century,85 and by 1795, “[t]he principal part of 
[Congress’s] time [was] taken up in reading and referring petitions.”86 
Petitions served as a “tool of democratic mass politics”87 and were 
“the most widespread means for popular participation in the political 
process.”88 
Interest groups used petitions to instigate “political dramas and 
highlight[] legislative deadlocks . . . [that prevented] popularly-
initiated deliberation on grievances.”89 Citizen petitions voiced public 
opinion on issues such as whether a National Bank should be created, 
how the Cherokees should be treated, and whether to criminalize 
dueling.90 
	
America than any other source of legislation.” Stephen Higginson, A Short History of the 
Right to Petition Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 144 
(1986). For example, in the early 1700s, over half of the statutes in Virginia and 
Connecticut originated from petitions to the government. Id. at 144 n.9. In Virginia, the 
number of petitions more than doubled in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Norman 
B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . .”: An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly 
Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1171–72 (1986) (citing RAYMOND C. 
BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETITIONING IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY VIRGINIA 32 (1979)). Similarly, in 1770, Connecticut’s General Assembly acted 
on over 150 petitions and created only fifteen laws on its own initiative. Higginson, supra, 
at 146; see also STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., 
PETITIONS, MEMORIALS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE CONSIDERATION 
OF CONGRESS, MARCH 4, 1789 TO DECEMBER 14, 1795, at 1 n.3 (Comm. Print 1986) 
[hereinafter PETITIONS, MEMORIALS] (noting major impact of petitions on federal 
legislation during 1790s). 
85 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 84, at 750–51 (“The practice of petitioning 
flourished in the fledgling national legislature. In the late eighteenth century, petitioning 
may well have enjoyed its apex in America, embracing both individual and collective 
written requests to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.” (footnote omitted)). 
86 David C. Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance of the 
Right of Petition, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 113, 117 (1991) (quoting Letter from John Fenno, 
U.S. Senate printer, to Joseph Ward (Dec. 25, 1795)). 
87 Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the 
Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2160 (1998). 
88 PETITIONS, MEMORIALS, supra note 84, at 6. 
89 Mark, supra note 87, at 2161. 
90 Higginson, supra note 84, at 156–57 (first two alterations in original). Higginson 
elaborates: 
Indeed, in Congress’ first decades petitions were received and considered, 
typically by referral to committees. The petition-response mechanism dealt 
procedurally with such controversial issues as contested election results, the 
National Bank, the expulsion of Cherokees from Georgia, land distribution, the 
abolition of dueling, government in the territories, the Alien and Sedition Acts, 
and the slave trade. Generally, favorable legislation or an adverse report halted 
further petitioning. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); accord Frederick, supra note 86, at 130 (citing GILBERT H. 
BARNES, THE ANTISLAVERY IMPULSE: 1830–1844, at 114 (1933)) (noting that 
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Although Congress was under no obligation to pass legislation on 
the basis of petitions, it took the process of reviewing them seriously. 
Until 1836, Congress had a standard procedure for reading and 
referring petitions to committees for reports.91 The review process 
became unsustainable, however, when Congress was flooded with 
anti-slavery petitions, and “[w]ith each succeeding resolution 
condemning [slavery and seeking abolition], the number of petitions 
multiplied to the point that normal House business became difficult, 
on occasion impossible.”92 To quell the debate, the House changed its 
internal procedures by passing a “gag rule” in 1836, which required 
that all anti-slavery petitions be tabled.93 
Even though the gag rule was repealed, petitions never regained 
their status as a serious agenda-setting tool.94 Under the 1844 repeal 
rule, the process for reviewing petitions was changed. Instead of 
receiving the attention of the entire House of Representatives, 
petitions were now referred to committees where they would “sleep 
the sleep of death.”95 Thus, the procedure eviscerated the right to 
petition because “there was little real difference between rejecting 
petitions and referring them to a committee that refused to issue a 
report.”96 
	
establishment of National Bank, Cherokee expulsion, cessation of Sunday postal service, 
and other matters of substantial public interest had yielded floods of petitions). 
91 Frederick, supra note 86, at 118; Mark, supra note 87, at 2160 (noting that “the 
process reflected the seriousness of petitions”). 
92 Frederick, supra note 86, at 130. 
93 12 REG. DEB. 4052 (1836) (resolving, on May 26, 1836, that the House of 
Representatives would indefinitely table all petitions regarding slavery or its abolition). 
This solution was never popular; when proposed previously, it had prompted former 
President John Quincy Adams, then serving as Representative from Massachusetts, to 
comment, “Well, sir, you begin with suppressing the right of petition; you must next 
suppress the right of speech in this House.” 12 REG. DEB. 2002 (1835). 
94 Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery 
Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835–37, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 785, 848–49 (1995). Professor 
Curtis relates: 
To many Congressmen, as Adams put it, the resolution was “a direct violation of 
the constitution of the United States . . . and the rights of my constituents.” As 
predicted by many, both in and out of Congress, the gag rule became a cause 
celebre, and the abolitionists made the most of it. Adams conducted brilliant 
guerilla warfare against it until it was finally abandoned in 1844. 
Id. 
95 11 REG. DEB. 1137 (1835) (speech of Rep. John Dickson of New York (quoting 
Psalms 13:3)). 
96 Frederick, supra note 86, at 127. As Representative Slade of Vermont said scornfully 
of petitions regarding slavery being delayed indefinitely by referral to a committee that 
would not issue a report, “The sacred right of petition!––that is to say, the ‘sacred right’ of 
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C. Citizen Initiatives 
Most modern democracies allow for some form of direct citizen 
input into government.97 While U.S. citizens have never been given a 
vote on their federal Constitution,98 the states, which had embraced 
referendums from colonial times,99 referred each of their state 
constitutions to their citizens for ratification.100 Despite allowing 
citizen input on ratification, however, the states, in these 
constitutions, followed the federal government’s lead in creating a 
system of representative democracy that strictly limited their citizens’ 
direct roles in making legislation.101 
	
being ‘nailed to the table,’ . . . or the ‘sacred right’ of being gathered . . . into the ‘family 
vault of all the Capulets.’” 12 REG. DEB. 2043 (1835). 
97 DuVivier, supra note 78, at 823 (noting that the United States is one of only five 
significant democracies in the world that has never held a nationwide electorate vote on 
some public issue). 
98 The Federal Constitution was ratified by conventions instead of a general vote. The 
Ratification of the Constitution, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/education 
/lessons/constitution-day/ratification.html (last visited July 7, 2013). 
99 Referendums date as far back as the Mayflower Treaty in 1620. Bruno Kaufmann & 
M. Dane Waters, Introduction, in DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE: A COMPREHENSIVE 
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROCESS IN EUROPE, at xix, xix 
(Bruno Kaufmann & M. Dane Waters eds., 2004) [hereinafter DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN 
EUROPE]. Even though the word “referendum” derives from the word “refer” and has been 
used only for measures that a political entity refers to the people, recent commentators 
have embraced the term to mean any “mass electorate vote[] on some public issue.” David 
Butler & Austin Ranney, Practice, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE 
GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 1, 1 & n.1 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds., 
1994) [hereinafter REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD]. Although the word “plebiscite” 
seems to more accurately describe any vote of the people, the word has taken on a negative 
connotation because plebiscites in Germany and other parts of the world were used as ad 
hoc votes to reinforce the actions of dictators. Id. For example, in March of 1936, Hitler’s 
Reichstag was approved by 98.1% of Germans. MAIJA SETÄLÄ, REFERENDUMS AND 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT: NORMATIVE THEORY AND THE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS 
1–2 (1999). 
100 All eligible citizens in Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts directly 
decided on their state constitutions by participating in referendums. FREDERIC JESUP 
STIMSON, POPULAR LAW-MAKING: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN, HISTORY, AND PRESENT 
TENDENCIES OF LAW-MAKING BY STATUTE 297 (1910) (noting: “for no constitution, with 
the exception of that of Virginia, has ever been adopted in any of our States except by the 
people at an election”). All states after 1910 have also adopted their state constitutions by 
a popular vote, and even Virginia submitted its constitution to a vote of the people in 1970. 
Constitutions of the Several States, GREEN PAPERS, http://www.thegreenpapers.com/slg 
/constitution.phtml (last visited July 7, 2013). 
101 A handful of states granted their citizens the right to instruct their legislators. 1 
ANNALS OF CONG. 685–792 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), reprinted in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1095 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) [hereinafter BILL OF 
RIGHTS HISTORY] (statement of Rep. Burke of South Carolina). “[T]he constitutions of 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina, all of them recognise [sic], in express 
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In the late 1890s, citizens began demanding the right to have a 
more direct voice. The Progressive party platform at this time 
included the ability of citizens to initiate legislation by gathering 
signatures.102 The citizen initiative103 was part of a package of 
reforms introducing more democratic processes as a cure for 
corruption and inaction by representative governments.104 Woodrow 
Wilson called the citizen initiative the “gun behind the door”105 of the 
legislatures because it allowed citizens to force legislation when 
elected officials were “paralyzed by inaction” from incompetence, or 
more often, from being controlled by moneyed special interests. The 
citizen initiative was an alternative way of making law that allowed 
“ordinary citizens to bypass [legislators] beholden to special interests 
[and] forcefully reminded lawmakers of the will of the majority 
outside the regular election cycle.”106 Citizens signed the petition; the 
measure was placed on the ballot; and if voted up by a majority of 
citizens, it became law. Thus, the citizen initiative allowed the people 
	
terms, the right of the people to give instruction to their representatives.” Id. at 1103. 
Maryland may also have allowed this right. Id. 
102 THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, 
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 50–51 (1989). 
103 For the purposes of this Article, the term “initiative” will generically encompass any 
direct democracy mechanism that forces a legislature to consider a matter outside the 
standard representative process. Direct democracy comes in many forms and varies widely 
from state to state. Some distinguish an “initiative” as a measure that citizens originate by 
petition from a “referendum,” which is legislation originating from a legislature and 
referred to the people for a vote. Other terms used to describe the process include 
“plebiscite,” “proposition,” or “amendment.” See generally INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM 
INST., A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROCESS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, [hereinafter IRI BRIEF HISTORY], available at www.iandrinstitute.org/New 
%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%20Boxes/Quick%20Facts/History%20of 
%20I&R.pdf; K.K. DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: Using Alternative 
Initiatives to Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1185, 1185 n.2 (1995). 
104 See GOEBEL, supra note 66, at 3–4. In addition to the initiative and referendum 
process, the Progressive movement sought a number of political reforms, including secret 
ballots, direct election of United States senators, primary elections, and women’s suffrage. 
Id. at 4. 
105 Id. at 55. 
106 IRI BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 103, at 2; see also Elizabeth Garrett, Direct 
Democracy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 139 (Daniel 
A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010); Daniel A. Smith & Dustin Fridkin, 
Delegating Direct Democracy: Interparty Legislative Competition and the Adoption of the 
Initiative in the American States, 102 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 333 (2008) (noting that when it 
was introduced, the initiative process allowed strong minority parties to dilute the 
institutional power of majority parties). 
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to enact statutes directly and to circumvent legislatures instead of 
working with them.107 
With South Dakota as the first in 1898,108 twenty-four states have 
now adopted some form of statewide process for citizen input in 
passing legislative, and sometimes constitutional, provisions.109 
Initiative use surged in its early years, declined from the 1940s to 
1960s,110 and then re-surged starting in the 1970s.111 The momentum 
continues today.112 
	
107 See, e.g., Beall v. State, 103 A. 99, 102–03 (Md. 1917) (opining that Maryland and 
other states amended their constitutions to provide for referendum veto of legislation in 
order to eliminate alleged control and corruption by “great corporations” and political 
parties); State v. Howell, 181 P. 920, 922 (Wash. 1919) (opining that citizens asserted 
referendum power due to perception that legislature had become unresponsive to popular 
will). One New Jersey reformer concluded that “representative government is a failure.” 
GOEBEL, supra note 66, at 36. On another occasion, supporters of direct legislation by the 
electorate characterized representative government as an “utter failure. It fails in the 
leaders it develops; it fails in its mechanism. It is cumbrous, uncertain, confused, 
irresponsible, undemocratic, often farcical and dishonest, and commonly partisan.” Id. at 
207 n.35 (quoting DIRECT LEGISLATION RECORD I 84 (Nat’l Direct Legislation League, 
1984)). 
108 South Dakota is given credit for having the first initiative process in 1898, and 
Oregon is credited with having the first such initiative on a ballot in 1904. CRONIN, supra 
note 102; DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1984); Garrett, supra note 106, at 137. The historical average of 
approval rates for initiatives, from 1904 to 2012, is forty-one percent. INITIATIVE & 
REFERENDUM INST., ELECTION RESULTS 2012: BREAKTHROUGH WINS FOR MARIJUANA 
AND SAME SEX MARRIAGE 1 (2012) [hereinafter IRI ELECTION RESULTS 2012], available 
at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%202012-3%20Election%20results%20v1.pdf. 
109 The following states allow some form of initiative: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See THOMAS M. DURBIN, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Rep. No. 81–63A, INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL: A 
RESUME OF STATE PROVISIONS (1981); IRI BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 103, at 4–5; see 
also Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the 
Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 11, 15 (1997) (“[T]wenty–five states [] have the referendum, twenty–three having 
some form of the initiative . . . .”). For a time, referendums represented a phenomenon 
largely limited to the West. When Alaska joined the Union in 1959, its constitution 
included the right for citizens to enact statutes or amend the state constitution by initiative. 
Florida adopted the statewide initiative in 1968, and Illinois followed suit in 1970. In 
1996, Rhode Island became the most recent state to adopt the process. IRI BRIEF HISTORY, 
supra note 103, at 5. 
110 See Charles M. Price, Initiative Qualifying in the States, 1898–1989: Variations in 
Usage, 12 FAM. L. & DEMOCRACY REP. 4, 4 (Feb. 1990). Thomas Goebel notes there 
were 246 ballot propositions in the 1930s, only 146 in the 1940s, and a mere eighty-five in 
the 1960s. GOEBEL, supra note 66, at 186. However, the number has grown steadily since 
the 1970s. Id. at 186–87; see also IRI BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 103, at 8 (reporting that 
initiative use peaked at 293 from 1911 to 1920, but steadily declined in subsequent 
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In 2012, American citizens in thirty-nine states voted on 186 
statewide initiatives and referendums.113 Forty-eight of these were 
citizen-initiated measures.114 Historically, Oregon, California, 
Colorado, North Dakota, and Arizona have used the referendum 
process most extensively.115 California and Oregon alone accounted 
for nearly one-third of all qualifying citizen initiatives in the 1980s, 
and the five high-use states historically accounted for nearly sixty 
percent of all citizen initiatives.116 Some commentators note that in 
states with the highest initiative use, all significant amendments to 
these states’ constitutions have originated as citizen-initiated 
measures.117 
Not long after initiative use resurged in the 1970s, commentators 
began to reassess the process.118 Criticisms sparked proposals for 
	
decades to a low of eighty-seven from 1961 to 1970, largely because of the two World 
Wars, the Great Depression, and the Korean War). 
111 Two of the most expansive decades of initiative use occurred during the years of 
1981–1990 and 1991–2000, where there were 271 and 389 initiative platforms 
respectively. IRI BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 103, at 8. 
112 The 1990–1999 decade and the 2000–2009 decade both resulted in records of over 
350 initiatives each. IRI BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 103, at 7–8. 
113 IRI ELECTION RESULTS 2012, supra note 108, at 1. In contrast, there were 163 in the 
2004 November elections. BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY CTR., BALLOT INITIATIVE & 
REFERENDUM, 2004 ELECTION RESULTS 2, 4 (2004), available at http://bisc.3cdn.net 
/386f89bb7ca82d0632_drm6iyd0f.pdf. Further, the November 2000 election involved only 
seventy-six. INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., GENERAL ELECTION POST ELECTION 
REPORT 7 (2002) [hereinafter IRI POST ELECTION REPORT], available at http://www.iandr 
institute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%20Boxes/Election%20 
Reports/2002%20General%20Election/2002%20POST-election%20Report%20-%2012     
-11-02%20-%20State%20by%20State.pdf. 
114 IRI ELECTION RESULTS 2012, supra note 108, at 1. 
115 Oregon has proposed 325 measures; California, 279; Colorado, 183; North Dakota, 
168; and Arizona, 154. IRI BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 103, at 8. 
116 See Price, supra note 110, at 4 (comparing the use of citizen-initiated referendums 
in the then twenty-three states that allowed this form of referendum). 
117 Richard B. Collins, How Democratic Are Initiatives?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 983, 983 
nn.2–3 (2001). Collins based his observations, in part, on data collected by Dennis Polhill. 
See Dennis Polhill, Are Coloradans Fit to Make Their Own Laws? A Common–Sense 
Primer on the Initiative Process, Issue Paper no. 8-96, INDEP. INST. app. B (Oct. 24, 1996) 
(summarizing election results on all Colorado ballot issues from 1912 to 1995), 
http://liberty.i2i.org/files/2011/02/IP_8-96.pdf; see also PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD 
FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 30 (1998); 
CAL. COMM’N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA’S 
FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1992); Hans A. Linde, Taking Oregon’s Initiative 
Toward a New Century, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 391, 391–98 (1998). 
118 MAGLEBY, supra note 108, at 5; see, e.g., Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of 
Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434 (1998) (arguing that plebiscites do not 
accurately reflect the complexities of voter preferences); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of 
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reform.119 Some of the sharpest criticism has arisen from the 
application of direct democracy in the context of complex fiscal 
decisions.120 “[V]oters do not fully understand the relationship 
between current deficits and future taxes,” expecting to be “taxed like 
libertarians, but subsidized like socialists.”121 One argument is that 
tax and other complex issues should remain within the exclusive 
province of representatives so that lawmakers can better weigh 
complex and competing concerns and respond to changing 
conditions.122 Many blame California’s fiscal dysfunction on direct 
democracy.123 Estimates of the percentage of California’s budget tied 
	
Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990) (discussing how courts should proceed in 
deciding constitutionality challenges to voter enactments); David B. Magleby, Let the 
Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 13, 46 (1995) (“Direct legislation is at best a supplement to representative 
democracy.”). 
119 See, e.g., CAL. COMM’N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING 
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1992); Collins, supra note 117; 
Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures That Do 
and Don’t Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47 (1995); PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST (1998). 
120 Peter Conti-Brown, Direct Democracy and State Fiscal Crises: The Problem of Too 
Much Law, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 43 (2012); Jessica A. Levinson & Robert 
M. Stern, Ballot Box Budgeting in California: The Bane of the Golden State or an 
Overstated Problem?, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 696 & n.34 (2010). But see John G. 
Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and Fiscal Gridlock: Have Voter Initiatives Paralyzed the 
California Budget?, 5 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 248 (2005) [hereinafter Fiscal Gridlock]; John 
G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy Works, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 185 (2005). But see David 
M. Primo, The Effect of Initiatives on Local Government Spending, 22 J. THEORETICAL 
POL. 6 (2010) (arguing that spending mandates reduced deadweight costs of taxation and 
increased local spending twelve to fourteen percent); S. Brock Blomberg, Gregory D. Hess 
& Akila Weerapana, The Impact of Voter Initiatives on Economic Activity, 20 EUR. J. POL. 
ECON. 207 (2004) (arguing that states with initiative systems waste twenty to thirty 
percent fewer resources). 
121 Conti-Brown, supra note 120, at 44 nn.3–4. In addition to California, discussed 
below, Colorado citizens have passed initiatives over the years that first cut taxes and then 
required certain payments to schools, creating conflicting, irreconcilable mandates. 
122 Levinson & Stern, supra note 120, at 696 & n.34. But see Conti-Brown, supra note 
120, at 45 (advocating that fiscal policy-making be taken from both the legislature and 
initiative/referendum control and instead lodged in a “federally created commission called 
the Fiscal Restoration Commission”). 
123 Fiscal Gridlock, supra note 120, at 250 tbl.1 (providing pundit comments on 
initiatives and the California budget from Panetta, Broder, Tyson, Schrag & ECONOMIST). 
Note that California voters passed Prop. 30 on November 6, 2012. California Proposition 
30, Sales and Income Tax Increases (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki 
/index.php/California_Proposition_30,_Sales_and_Income_Tax_Increase_%282012%29 
(last modified Feb. 18, 2013). This proposition increases taxes on earnings over $250,000 
for seven years and sales taxes by one-fourth of a percent for four years, to fund schools. 
Id. Prop. 30 also guarantees public safety realignment funding. Id. The fiscal impact will 
be increased state tax revenues through 2018–19, averaging about $6 billion annually over 
the next few years. Id. These revenues will be available for funding the state budget. Id. 
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up by voter-mandated initiatives range from thirty-three to seventy 
percent.124 These unfunded set-asides, in combination with initiative-
created restrictions on raising revenue, like Proposition 13, have 
“increased nonguaranteed debt,” “privatized the public fisc,” and 
“devolved the authority to lay and collect taxes and to spend the 
proceeds so gained.”125 
Despite these problems, the approval rate for initiatives is high,126 
and initiative democracy continues to grow. Defenders argue that 
initiatives serve as a valuable way of giving citizens a direct voice in 
their government. Elizabeth Garrett notes that “the appropriate frame 
for any analysis of direct democracy is that of ‘hybrid democracy’” 
because of the profound impact “the presence of robust direct 
democracy” has on “[l]egislators and the traditional legislative 
process.”127 Even though the initiative process is currently restricted 
to state and local governments, it has had considerable influence on 
public policy nationwide.128 
So, should we have a national initiative process to allow citizen 
input on federal legislation? Scholars have proposed such a process to 
allow citizens to initiate laws at the federal level, whether through a 
binding129 or nonbinding vote.130 In fact, some opinion polls have 
	
Additionally, in 2012–13, planned spending reductions, primarily to education programs, 
will not occur. Id. But Prop. 31 failed. California Proposition 31, Two-Year State Budget 
Cycle (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California 
_Proposition_31,_Two-Year_State_Budget_Cycle_%282012%29 (last modified Feb. 21, 
2013). Prop. 31 would have established a two-year state budget and set rules for offsetting 
new expenditures and Governor budget cuts in fiscal emergencies. Id. 
124 Levinson & Stern, supra note 120, at 697 & nn.39–40. 
125 Colin H. McCubbins & Mathew D. McCubbins, Proposition 13 and the California 
Fiscal Shell Game, 2 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 1 (2010). See also Nicholas Hromalik, Setting 
Aside Politicians: The Effects of Set-Aside Initiatives on California Local Governments, 2 
CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 1 (2010) (arguing initiatives create “higher taxes on all”). 
126 IRI ELECTION RESULTS 2012, supra note 108, at 1. 
127 Garrett, supra note 106, at 138. 
128 Initiatives on various public policy issues have brought about fundamental changes 
in the United States, including, but not limited to: women gaining the right to vote; 
election of politicians through direct primaries; prohibition on state-funded abortions; 
creation of the eight-hour workday; legalization of physician-assisted suicide; placement 
of term limits on elected officials; adoption and abolishment of prohibition; abolishment of 
poll taxes; legalization of marijuana; and adoption of campaign finance reform. IRI BRIEF 
HISTORY, supra note 103, at 6. 
129 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE 
CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 38 (1998); CRONIN, supra note 102, 
at 12–22, 41; Alan Hirsch, Direct Democracy and Civic Maturation, 29 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 185 (2002); Clayton P. Gillette, Is Direct Democracy Anti-Democratic?, 34 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 609, 618 (1998); Dennis W. Arrow, Representative Government 
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shown that the majority of Americans would favor a national statutory 
initiative.131 Yet, there has been no indication that Congress has the 
slightest interest in sharing with citizens any of its power to create 
laws. E-legislating may change this. 
D. E-Legislating Under the Obama Administration 
The petition and initiative efforts outlined above currently fail to 
give citizens any direct role in federal lawmaking beyond electing 
their representatives. E-legislating represents how electronic tools 
might change that dynamic. This section illustrates the growing 
significance of e-legislating by describing how Obama supporters 
have used, and plan to use, e-legislating to increase citizen 
involvement in the lawmaking process. 
Obama’s community organizer roots132 were reflected from the 
very start of his 2008 campaign. His message of inclusiveness and 
self-actualization resonated with voters, enabling him to motivate 
record numbers to register and vote.133 It is no surprise that the very 
first document Obama signed when he took office in 2009 was the 
	
and Popular Distrust: The Obstruction/Facilitation Conundrum Regarding State 
Constitutional Amendment by Initiative Petition, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 3 (1992). 
130 DuVivier, supra note 78 (calling for a federal nonbinding initiative process to allow 
citizen votes on issues of national significance). 
131 A national poll reflected backing for a national statutory initiative at a three-to-one 
margin (with fifty-seven percent of Americans favoring it and only twenty-one percent 
opposed). DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE 
REVOLUTION 176 (1989); see also CRONIN, supra note 102, at 4–5, 157–95 (1989); 
MAGLEBY, supra note 108 at 7, 12–14. Mike Gravel, a former U.S. Senator from Alaska, 
used the Internet to garner support for the National Initiative for Democracy, a proposed 
constitutional amendment and federal statute to establish procedures for citizens to make 
laws by ballot initiative. See Senator Mike Gravel, Edwin and Joyce Koupal’s 
Contribution to Democracy, THE DEMOCRACY FOUNDATION (Sept. 1, 2001), 
http://demofound.org /symposium/5.htm; National Citizens Initiative for Democracy, THE 
DEMOCRACY FOUNDATION, http://ni4d.us/national_initiative (last visited July 12, 2013). 
132 See BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER, 164–206, 249–95 (2004). 
133 Approximately 146 million people were registered and 131 million people voted in 
the 2008 presidential election, an increase of four million registrations and five million 
votes from 2004. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, VOTING AND 
REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2008, at 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p20-562.pdf. The number of voters was the most 
ever in a presidential election, though the percentage of voter turnout did not set a record, 
possibly because of low Republican turnout. Number of Votes Cast Set Record, But Voter 
Turnout Percentage Didn’t, CNN, Nov. 6, 2008, http://articles.cnn.com/2008-11-06 
/politics/voter.turnout_1_voter-turnout-curtis-gans-absentee-ballots?_s=PM:POLITICS. 
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Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government.134 In this 
memorandum, Obama announced his vision that government should 
stand on three pillars—transparency, participation, and 
collaboration—and that this vision was to be implemented through 
digital technology.135 
While some argue that Obama’s pledge was more symbolic than 
substantive,136 a number of federal agencies responded with 
innovative digital outreach projects. NASA used social media tools to 
promote interest in its missions.137 The Federal Communication 
Commission’s website allowed citizens to track its broadband plan 
and share information with the agency through Twitter.138 In addition, 
the Recovery.gov website provided fiscal transparency by allowing 
anyone to track spending on projects funded by the Stimulus bill and 
to report fraud or waste.139 
	
134 Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Transparency 
Memorandum]. 
135 Id. at 4685; see also Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Office of Mgmt. 
& Budget, on Open Gov’t Directive to the Heads of Exec. Dep’t & Agencies 9 (Dec. 8, 
2009). The OMB directive lists, as one component of the Open Government plan: 
Participation: To create more informed and effective policies, the Federal 
Government should promote opportunities for the public to participate 
throughout the decision-making process. Your agency’s Open Government Plan 
should explain in detail how your agency will improve participation, including 
steps your agency will take to revise its current practices to increase 
opportunities for public participation in and feedback on the agency’s core 
mission activities. The specific details should include proposed changes to 
internal management and administrative policies to improve participation. 
i. The Plan should include descriptions of and links to appropriate websites 
where the public can engage in existing participatory processes of your 
agency. 
ii. The Plan should include proposals for new feedback mechanisms, 
including innovative tools and practices that create new and easier methods 
for public engagement. 
Id. 
136 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transparency, Accountability, and Competency: An 
Essay on the Obama Administration, Google Government, and the Difficulties of Securing 
Effective Governance, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 459–75 (2011) (“The Obama 
Administration’s Commitment to Transparency and Openness is Far From Total.”); 
Testing Obama’s Promise of Government Transparency, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2012, 
9:00 PM), http://go.bloomberg.com/multimedia/bloomberg-checks-obama-transparency/ 
(providing an open government scorecard). 
137 Connect and Collaborate with NASA, NASA.GOV, http://www.nasa.gov/connect 
/social/index.html (last visited July 12, 2013). 
138 FCC Connect, FCC.GOV, http://www.fcc.gov/connect (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). 
139 Track the Money, RECOVERY.GOV, http://www.recovery.gov/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited July 12, 2013). 
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Among the three pillars of government laid out, Obama’s approach 
was perhaps most innovative in its commitment to “offer Americans 
increased opportunities to participate in policymaking and to provide 
their Government with the benefits of their collective expertise and 
information.”140 Thus, Obama sought to crowdsource the 
development of U.S. policy. 
Although the concept of outsourcing problem solving to the public 
is not a new idea—at least one author observes that in the late 
nineteenth century, the Oxford English Dictionary was “history’s first 
massively-crowdsourced collation of English knowledge”141—
Obama’s effort to use online platforms for developing policy was. 
The January 2009 Memorandum only addressed action at the 
federal administrative level, but even before the election, candidate 
Obama had opened up new channels for citizen input on legislation 
and policy. Candidate Obama offered citizens the opportunity to 
submit ideas and questions to him through the Change.gov platform, 
and he received almost five million votes on some of the ideas 
submitted.142 
In addition, the Obama administration created something 
comparable to the constitutional right to petition. As discussed in Part 
II.B above, petitions are now routinely ignored by Congress. In 
	
140 Transparency Memorandum, supra note 134, at 4685. That portion of the memo 
states: 
Government should be participatory. Public engagement enhances the 
Government’s effectiveness and improves the quality of its decisions. 
Knowledge is widely dispersed in society, and public officials benefit from 
having access to that dispersed knowledge. Executive departments and agencies 
should offer Americans increased opportunities to participate in policymaking 
and to provide their Government with the benefits of their collective expertise 
and information. Executive departments and agencies should also solicit public 
input on how we can increase and improve opportunities for public participation 
in Government. 
Id. 
141 Nate Lanxon, How the Oxford English Dictionary Started out like Wikipedia, 
WIRED.CO.UK (Jan. 13, 2011) http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2011-01/13/the         
-oxford-english-wiktionary. 
142 However, when Obama tried similar participatory activities as President, such as the 
Open Government Initiative, the number of participants dropped with each phase, down to 
approximately 2000 in the last. SCOTT BITTLE, CHRIS HALLER & ALISON KADLEC, CENT. 
FOR ADVANCES IN PUB. ENGAGEMENT, PROMISING PRACTICES IN ONLINE ENGAGEMENT 
5, n.6 (2009), available at http://www.publicagenda.org/files/pdf/PA_CAPE_Paper3 
_Promising_Mech2.pdf; Jesse Lee, Open for Questions Round 2: Response, CHANGE.GOV 
(Jan. 9, 2009), http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/open_for_questions_round_2_response/ 
(cited in Paul Johnston, Transforming Government’s Policy-Making Processes, 2 
EJOURNAL EDEMOCRACY & OPEN GOV’T 162, 162 n.2 (2010)). 
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response, the Obama administration attempted to create an electronic 
counterpart within the Executive branch. On September 22, 2011, the 
White House launched its “We the People” website.143 Through the 
website, the administration pledges to respond to any petition that 
meets its threshold of signatures.144 Unlike Congress, which could 
reinvigorate the petition process to set its legislative agenda, the 
White House may not have the power to use this platform to create 
laws. However, the electronic petition platform at least provides an 
outlet for citizen frustration and some kind of government response to 
petitions, which was foreclosed when Congress adopted its current 
procedure. 
The “We the People” platform has opened discussion on important 
issues, but some citizens also have abused it. For example, a Colorado 
man filed a petition on November 14, 2012, for the “construction of a 
Death Star by 2016.”145 That petition met the threshold for signatures, 
thus requiring a government response.146 
In addition to his “We the People” website and his Memorandum 
on Transparency and Open Government, President Obama declared, 
when he first welcomed his senior staff and cabinet to the White 
House in 2009, that “the way to solve the problems of our time, as 
one nation, is by involving the American people in shaping the 
policies that affect their lives.”147 His use of the phrase, “You and I, 
as citizens” in his 2013 inauguration address echoes the same 
	
143 Katelyn Sabochik, Petition the White House with We the People, WHITE 
HOUSE.GOV (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/09/22/petition-white 
-house-we-people. 
144 We the People, Terms of Participation, WHITE HOUSE.GOV, https://petitions 
.whitehouse.gov/how-why/terms-participation (last visited July 12, 2013) (indicating that 
the signature threshold was raised to 100,000 on January 15, 2013). 
145 Secure Resources and Funding, and Begin Construction of a Death Star by 2016, 
Petition to the Obama Administration, WHITE HOUSE.GOV, https://petitions.whitehouse 
.gov/petition/secure-resources-and-funding-and-begin-construction-death-star-2016/wlfKz 
FkN (last visited July 12, 2013). 
146 At the time the Death Star petition was filed, the threshold for signatures was only 
25,000. The petition received 27,456. Mitchell Byars, Longmont Man’s Petition for U.S.-
Built Death Star Draws Support, DENVER POST (Dec. 15, 2012), http://www.denverpost 
.com/news/ci_22196415/longmont-mans-petition-u-s-built-death-star?. 
147 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President in 
Welcoming Senior Staff and Cabinet Secretaries to the White House (Jan. 21, 2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-welcoming-
senior-staff-and-cabinet-secretaries-white-house. 
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theme.148 And the Organizing for Action campaign seems to be 
taking this goal to the new level of e-legislating. 
With the current representative government, U.S. citizens have a 
significant voice during elections but virtually no voice between 
election cycles when actual laws are made. During the legislating 
phase, large donors and interest groups with enough money to hire 
lobbyists enjoy a significant advantage in terms of gaining legislators’ 
attention. The average citizen is relegated to expressing his or her 
opinion at town hall meetings or through an occasional phone call or 
letter that is easily lost among the thousands received each week.149 
What will Organizing for Action do to shift the balance so that 
average citizens will have more say in legislating? The website is 
vague: “this is your movement . . . it can do whatever you make of 
it.”150 Presumably, the approach will involve campaigns with 
“ladders-of-engagement,”151 combining many of the actions in 
electronic as well as traditional forms: petitions, letter writing, calls to 
representatives, rallies, and lobbying opportunities. What will be 
different is the potential for intensifying all of these activities through 
the power of the Internet and social media so that they become more 
effective. Thus, e-legislating will allow a difference-in-degree of 
citizen activity. 
Will e-legislating also allow citizen participation of a 
fundamentally different kind? Perhaps so. The extension of the 
fundraising function will allow groups to prepare and air 
informational ads to hold legislators accountable. In addition, the 
following section will describe in more detail some of the distinctions 
between e-legislating and traditional citizen input into federal 
legislation. The goal is to use the “powerful transformative potential” 
of digital technologies to “begin a new chapter in citizen participation 
and public accountability.”152 
	
148 Barack Obama, President of the United States, 2013 Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 
2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/21 
/transcript-president-obama-2013-inaugural-address/. 
149 E-mail from Mark Udall, U.S. Senator for Colorado, to author (Jan. 28, 2013) (on 
file with author) (estimating he receives 10,000 letters each week). 
150 Michele Obama, Organizing for Action: You In?, BARACKOBAMA.COM, 
https://my.barackobama.com/page/s/organizing-for-action (last visited July 12, 2013). 
151 David Karpf, Online Political Mobilization from the Advocacy Group’s Perspective: 
Looking Beyond Clicktivism, 2 POL’Y & INTERNET 7, 16 (2010). 
152 Jennifer Shkabatur, Digital Technology and Local Democracy in America, 76 
BROOK. L. REV. 1413, 1416 (2011). 
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III 
DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF E-LEGISLATING 
The Internet was a critical component of Revolution 2.0’s success. 
Without the ability to enter the world stage cheaply, the Facebook and 
Twitter coordinators of the revolution would not have been able to 
gain global support and protection because of the world’s scrutiny of 
the situation. Without the safe space of the Internet, the coordinators 
could have been more easily isolated and silenced by authorities.153 
Without the speed and flexibility provided by the Internet to adjust to 
on-the-ground conditions, the groups of protestors could have been 
crushed by government forces.154 Without instantaneous posts that 
included compelling, emotional music and graphics, Khaled’s death 
and the following demonstrations would not have had the personal 
relevance needed to create community involvement and motivate 
mass participation.155 
While some authors argue that online activism simply represents a 
“difference-of-degree rather than a difference-in-kind” from 
traditional activism,156 this section will address the “unique 
characteristics” of the Internet157 and some of the arguments that have 
been made about whether these characteristics justify different 
	
153 As Ghonim noted at the end of his book, 
The Egyptian revolution showed us that the great mass of people who are 
normally risk-averse, aren’t normally activists, can become extraordinarily 
brave and active when they unite together as one. It was like an offline 
Wikipedia, with everyone anonymously and selflessly contributing efforts 
toward a common goal. . . . Revolutions of the past have usually had charismatic 
leaders who were politically savvy and sometimes even military geniuses. Such 
revolutions followed what we can call the Revolution 1.0 model. . . . [Egypt] 
was the Revolution 2.0 model: no one was the hero because everyone was a 
hero.  
GHONIM, supra note 2, at 293–94. 
154 The protests swelled as news got out on the Internet. Rumors were that the 
government tried to block access, but some electronic messages could still get through. 
E.g., GHONIM, supra note 2, at 184–86. Although the Syrian government claims it was not 
responsible, Internet access disappeared across the country for multiple days at the end of  
November 2012—raising fears of escalation of a government crackdown on the uprising. 
Catherine Smith, Syria’s Internet Reportedly Shut Down, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 29, 
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/29/syria-internet-down_n_2211458 .html. 
155 It was a photograph of Khaled’s battered face that first motivated Ghonim to launch 
the webpage. GHONIM, supra note 2, at 59. Ghonim posted a stirring video with music 
instead of using “the regular practice of lawyers and human rights defenders, who used 
facts and statistics to garner support. Instead, the video created an emotional bond between 
the cause and the target audience.” GHONIM, note 2, at 86–87. 
156 Karpf, supra note 151, at 9. 
157 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 583 (2002). 
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treatment of Internet data under the law. It also will consider whether 
the use of the Internet may result in a different quality of response 
from citizens and legislators that could undermine its effectiveness. 
This section concludes with the ultimate question: whether e-
legislating efforts will have any greater impact than conventional 
lobbying campaigns. 
A. Size and Geographic Scope of the Internet 
“A unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human 
communication.”158 
Thomas Paine’s best-selling pamphlet Common Sense helped drive 
the American Revolutionary War. Advocating an alternative to 
British rule, its influence spread as 120,000 to 150,000 copies were 
printed in 1776 and circulated across colonial America, where it was 
read aloud in homes and taverns.159 But the ability of the printing 
press to disperse information is no match for the eye-popping 
numbers of the Internet for which the term “going viral” was coined 
to capture the enormity of the phenomenon.160 With one post, the 
Egyptian revolutionaries expanded their reach twenty times, leading 
them to conclude that Mubarak’s “usual methods of oppression might 
not work in this new world.”161 
While quantity of participants may be the most obvious distinction 
between traditional input to legislators and e-legislating, the 
additional number of participants may be detrimental if their input is 
duplicative and unfiltered. In the context of e-rulemaking, some 
agency recipients have objected to the extra administrative and mental 
burden of sorting through vast numbers of comments to find those 
with relevance and focus.162 As with the number of legal arguments 
	
158 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 
824, 844 (1996)). The Court in Reno held the Communications Decency Act of 1996 was 
facially overbroad and unconstitutional. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864–65. 
159 Robert A. Ferguson, The Commonalities of Common Sense, 57 WM. & MARY Q. 
465, 466 (2000). 
160 Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “viral” as “quickly and widely spread or 
popularized especially by person-to-person electronic communication.” Viral, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/viral (last visited July 12, 
2013). 
161 The Revolutionaries went from about 5000 to 7000 followers to 120,000 followers 
with one post. GHONIM, supra note 2, at 84–85. 
162 Benjamin, supra note 45, at 909. 
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in a brief, the inclusion of weaker points may dilute the impact of 
stronger ones. 
Closely related to the numbers of participants is the world-wide 
scope of Internet postings. As the Supreme Court has noted, “the 
geographic reach of the Internet is greater than anything which could 
have been designed in colonial times.”163 This combination of 
breadth, along with the inability to control the geographic location of 
its audience, split the Court in its consideration of the impact of the 
Internet when determining whether the Child Online Protection Act 
violated First Amendment guarantees of free speech.164 This 
geographic breadth may be an advantage for getting information out 
to all parts of the country. However, in the legislative context, 
effective pressure on a particular representative will most likely come 
from those who have the power to vote him or her out of office. Thus, 
identifying whether those commenting are constituents is important. 
B. Anonymity of and Cost to Internet Speakers 
“[E]asy and cheap to reach a worldwide audience.”165 
The standing joke is that we are younger, taller, and better looking 
on the Internet than in real life.166 This is because the audience 
usually does not know the person behind the other screen. Anonymity 
was critical in Egypt’s Revolution 2.0. When the authors of the 
revolutionary “We Are All Khaled” website accidentally released data 
via their posts that could have been used to identify them, they 
panicked, believing the government would quickly seek them out and 
silence them.167 This has been the fate of some who spoke their minds 
	
163 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003). The Smith court held that the Alaska Sex 
Offender Registry Act was not punitive even though the data was posted on the Internet, 
which provided for widespread public access outside of the state. Id. at 105, 109. 
164 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 565, 586 (2002) (remanding case to the Third 
Circuit to decide which provisions of the Act might be too broad). 
165 Id. at 595. 
166 A most recent example is the “Catfish” phenomenon, popularized by a documentary 
movie and television show that chronicles online dating relationships where one or both 
parties have misrepresented their identity. The recent saga with Notre Dame star football 
player Manti Te’o raised the issue to national prominence. See, e.g., Ben Zimmer, Catfish: 
How Manti Te’o’s Imaginary Romance Got Its Name, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2013, 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/01/27/catfish-how-manti-imaginary-romance-got 
-its-name/inqu9zV8RQ7j19BRGQkH7H/story.html. 
167 Ghonim refused to disclose that he was the administrator of the Kullena Khaled Said 
webpage and panicked when he made mistakes that led a few to discern who he was. 
GHONIM, supra note 2, at 115. 
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in other countries,168 and it illustrates the significance of this unique 
aspect of the Internet forum in those high-risk contexts. 
Internet anonymity can also be valuable in the United States. 
Although the First Amendment protects us from the government, we 
may need to fear extremists who issue death threats if what we have 
posted does not mesh with their beliefs. The Supreme Court 
addressed the role of anonymity in Doe v. Reed.169 In Reed, plaintiffs 
sought a preliminary injunction to bar public disclosure of referendum 
petitions.170 Plaintiffs were concerned that interest groups planned to 
post the petitions on the Internet, exposing the signatories to possible 
harassment.171 The Court held that Washington State’s Public 
Records Act, which required the disclosure, did not violate the First 
Amendment.172 
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion distinguishes the roles citizens 
can play in the legislative process as discussed in Part II above. While 
the United States currently allows anonymity during the election stage 
through a secret ballot,173 Scalia observes that “the exercise of 
lawmaking power in the United States has traditionally been public. . . 
. [E]ven when the people asked Congress for legislative changes—by 
exercising their constitutional right to ‘to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances,’ U.S. Const., Amdt. 1—they did so 
publicly.”174 
Scalia also noted in his Reed concurrence that when a voter signs a 
referendum petition, “he is acting as a legislator.”175 Therefore, 
“electioneering disclosure cases,” which allow anonymity, are 
	
168 Keeping anonymity is probably a smart move. For example, thirty-five-year-old 
activist blogger Sattar Beheshti fell under the custody of Iran’s cyberpolice and was killed 
in early November of 2012. The Associated Press, Blogger’s Death in Iran Opens Window 
on Cyber Patrols, DENVER POST (Nov. 23, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.denverpost.com 
/nationworld/ci_22050493?source=rss. 
169 John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010). 
170 Id. at 2813. 
171 Id. at 2825. 
172 Id. at 2821. 
173 Scalia notes, however, that this was not always the case: “Legislating was not the 
only governmental act that was public in America. Voting was public until 1888 when the 
States began to adopt the Australian secret ballot.” Id. at 2834. 
174 Id. at 2833–34. The opinion goes on to say, “The petition was read aloud in 
Congress. Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 726 (2002). . . . 
Even when the people exercised legislative power directly, they did so not anonymously, 
but openly in town hall meetings. See generally J. ZIMMERMAN, THE NEW ENGLAND 
TOWN MEETING (1999).” Id. at 2834. 
175 Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2833. 
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distinguishable from the Reed situation, which involved a referendum, 
and therefore, legislative action.176 
While there may be advantages to anonymity, it is less valuable in 
the context of e-legislating, which encourages others to influence their 
legislators on a vote. Contacts with familiar sources usually prove 
most persuasive; i.e., in the Obama campaign, social networks made a 
difference—Tweets and Facebook messages from friends were more 
effective than ads.177 Also, relying on a trusted organization, whether 
the National Rifle Association or the Sierra Club, can influence 
group-based decision-making, as discussed below. 
The low cost of entry and efficiency also are significant in the e-
legislating context. The Internet can be a great leveling force for the 
general public as against the moneyed interests, which tend to 
dominate political discourse under conventional methods. Those with 
more money can hire lobbyists, who are cost prohibitive for more 
grass-roots groups. The Internet may be able to empower traditionally 
less-represented groups to inexpensively organize and mobilize to 
influence elected officials on the same level as their richer 
counterparts.178 
While addressing the role of money, we must consider the 
cynicism of some who believe the main object of many social media 
campaigns is not to encourage public involvement, but rather to raise 
funds.179 There is little doubt that electronic mediums have allowed a 
	
176 Id. at 2833 n.3. 
177 See, e.g., Richard Parker, Social and Anti-Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 
2012, 9:16 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/social-and-anti-
social-media/ (noting that the Obama campaign’s ability to move beyond “traditional 
media” was a big factor in connecting with voters, particularly Hispanics, African 
Americans, and voters under thirty). 
178 For example, in the October 2012 presidential debate when Mitt Romney used the 
phrase “binders full of women,” the social media universe exploded. At one point during 
the debate, the phrase was mentioned 40,000 times in one minute on social media. 
Timothy Stenovec, ‘Binders Full of Women’: Mitt Romney’s Comment Goes Viral, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 16, 2012, 11:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10 
/16/binders-full-of-women-mitt-romney_n_1972337.html. Pay equity and other women’s 
rights issues immediately became a topic of paramount political importance in the 
campaign. Michael D. Shear, Debate Moves Women to Fore in Race for the White House, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/us/politics/obama-and   
-romney-focus-on-efforts-to-woo-women.html?_r=0. 
179 As most of the Internet campaigns include a “donate” button, some cynics believe 
fundraising and not activism is the motivation for many of these campaigns. For example, 
the Kony 2012 video, which went viral in early 2012, purported to raise public 
consciousness about the atrocities of Ugandan-born rebel leader Joseph Kony, who for 
almost twenty years terrorized villagers in at least four countries in central Africa—killing 
tens of thousands of adults, turning young boys into soldiers, and turning girls into sex 
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broader base of supporters to donate small amounts to a candidate or 
cause to counteract large donations from a few.180 As an example, the 
	
slaves. The video was a fundraising success far exceeding expectations. Kony 2012, 
INVISIBLE CHILDREN, invisiblechildren.com/kony/ (last visited July 13, 2013). The 
sponsoring group, Invisible Children, received millions of dollars in donations and ran out 
of its “Kony Kits” within days, so a website was created for consumers to shop for Kony 
2012 t-shirts and other merchandise. SHOP MOS, http://www.shopmos.com/kony-2012 
?i=us_1_34684~5336690021 (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). See also Mike Pflanz, Joseph 
Kony 2012: Growing Outrage in Uganda over Film, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 8, 2012, 4:40 
PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/uganda/9131469 
/Joseph-Kony-2012-growing-outrage-in-Uganda-over-film.html. (“Invisible Voices has 
faced criticism over its finances. Of more than £6 million it spent in 2001, less than £2.3 
million was for activities helping people on the ground. The rest went on ‘awareness 
programmes [sic] and products’, [sic] management, media, and others.”); Tory Shepherd, 
Remember Kony 2012? Well, It’s 2013. What happened?, NEWS.COM.AU (Jan. 11, 2013, 
6:15 AM), http://www.news.com.au/world-news/remember-kony-2012-well-its-2013-what 
-happened/story-fndir2ev-1226550575923 (“The organisation [sic] which urged grassroots 
campaigners to help take down the African warlord Joseph Kony made nearly $20 million 
last year with its Kony 2012 campaign. And according to Invisible Children’s 2011–12 
financial report, the company still has $12.6 million of campaign funds in its coffers after 
spending $6.7 million on expenses.”). Similarly, interest groups may be using social media 
petitions and lobbying efforts to fire up constituents and increase traffic to their Websites. 
Some grants require statistics of such Internet traffic as evidence that a potential recipient 
of funding is worthy. Therefore, one might cynically conclude that many of the initiators 
of these campaigns know that the signatures and letters that they are seeking will have 
little to no impact, yet they encourage these campaigns for their own financial benefit. 
Addressing this concern in more depth is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., MARK 
SURMAN & KATHERINE REILLY, SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL, APPROPRIATING 
THE INTERNET FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: TOWARDS THE STRATEGIC USE OF NETWORKED 
TECHNOLOGIES BY TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (2003), available 
at http://library.uniteddiversity.coop/Effective_Organising/Appropriating_the_Internet_for 
_Social_Change.pdf. 
No one has yet figured out a reliable and dramatically successful new model for 
sustaining online technology and media projects. 
 In the mean time, the old techniques of donor dependency and extreme 
volunteerism are used to keep most projects alive. In some regards, there is 
nothing wrong with this. We have known for a very long time that socially 
relevant media and communications projects require outside support to provide. 
The problem is that donors have both moved to more project based funding and 
put pressure on grantees to find new, independent revenue models. 
Id. at 75; Dana R. Fisher, The Activism Industry, CBSNEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-215_162-2013172.html?pageNum=1 (talking about how 
activist organizations cannot afford to do grassroots outreach on their own, so they 
outsource it to organizations that specialize in outreach and canvass for many 
organizations). 
180 For example, a school bus monitor received over $500,000 from Internet supporters 
after some teenagers harassed her and the video was posted on YouTube. Meaghan M. 
McDermott, Fundraising Passes $500,000 for Victim of Bus Taunting, U.S.A. TODAY, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-06-21/bus-taunt-victim-fund 
raising/55729944/1, (last updated June 22, 2012, 5:11 PM). 
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Obama campaign used social media to raise $147 million from donors 
who gave $200 or less.181 
Overall, the ability of the party posting Internet data to remain 
unknown or unauthenticated and the low cost of entry have mixed 
benefits and detriments. It allows the “bypassing [of] traditionally 
powerful communication gatekeepers.”182 Instead of having a few 
news networks controlled by the government or powerful corporate 
interests, the public can receive news from alternative, sometimes 
unknown, sources. This enables “Internet users to reconfigure their 
access to other people, information, services and technologies.”183 
While this process may positively disrupt normal balances of 
power and expectations, it also eliminates some of the filtering 
functions those gatekeepers performed. Elimination of the 
gatekeepers will require Internet users to be more vigilant in assuring 
accuracy, scientific support, or verification.184 Transparency can help 
because it “enables the electorate to make informed decisions and 
give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”185 
C. Type, Speed, and Quality of Information Received 
“[D]ynamic and instantaneous forms of communication . . . 
actually represent[] a return to the tribal era, for network society 
displays many of the characteristics of preliterate oral societies.”186 
	
181 The smaller donors of $200 or less accounted for thirty-four percent of Obama’s 
total receipts from individuals. The less social-media savvy Romney campaign raised only 
$39.5 million from such small donors, or eighteen percent of his total receipts from 
individuals. Julianna Goldman, Obama Winning Social Media, If #Hashtagwars Really 
Matter, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10 
-22/obama-winning-social-media-if-hashtagwars-really-matter.html. 
182 DUTTON & PELTU, supra note 11, at 7. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 5–7. 
185 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (“With the 
advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and 
citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable 
for their positions and supporters. Shareholders can determine whether their corporation’s 
political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making profits, and citizens can see 
whether elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests. The First 
Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to 
react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the 
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and 
messages.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). 
186 David Howes, e-Legislation: Law-Making in the Digital Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 39, 
41–42 (2001). 
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Sociologists have documented that Internet rhetoric is more 
emotional.187 Some of this may be due to the stimuli of the Internet; 
some to the speed of responses; and still more to anonymity and lack 
of accountability. Justice Scalia used this as an argument against 
anonymity in the legislative context: 
Requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters 
civic courage, without which democracy is doomed. For my part, I 
do not look forward to a society which . . . exercises the direct 
democracy of initiative and referendum hidden from public scrutiny 
and protected from the accountability of criticism.188 
This section will address how information received electronically 
compares to more conventional modes, focusing on distinctions in 
type, speed, and quality. 
1. Type 
It is unlikely that the “We Are All Khaled” website would have 
gotten the response it did if it had not included photos of Khaled’s 
bashed and bloody head. Instead of focusing on “facts and statistics,” 
the revolutionaries used this photo and stirring videos to “creat[e] an 
emotional bond between the cause and the target audience.”189 
One of the Internet’s attractions is its ability to communicate in 
ways beyond the written word. As Internet speeds increase and video 
postings proliferate, more and more users are garnering information 
through multimedia—images, music, animations, and videos. 
In his article, e-Legislation: Law-Making in the Digital Age, David 
Howes, an anthropology professor at Concordia University, does not 
address the process of e-legislating as discussed here. Instead, he 
describes the impact of the Internet on legislation from the 
perspective of communications studies. He argues: 
[B]oth the construction and dissemination of legislation tend to be 
inflected by the implicit normative structure of the prevailing mode 
of communication (oral, print, or digital). 
As cyberspace becomes more interactive, more sensuous, and more 
ubiquitous through new developments in network technology, the 
way in which legislation is conceptualized and experienced may 
	
187 See Matt Ridley, Internet On, Inhibitions Off: Why We Tell All, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
18, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204795304577221164189123 
608.html. 
188 John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2837 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
189 GHONIM, supra note 2, at 86–87. See also WE ARE ALL KHALED SAID, 
http://www.elshaheeed.co.uk/ (last visited July 13, 2013). 
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become less and less textual (i.e. informed by the icon of the statute 
book) and more like a song, a dance, or even a feast—all traditional 
forms of legal expression in oral societies.190 
Howes argues that digital modes more closely follow how humans 
have been mentally wired in oral societies in the past. Thus, they are 
“motivated by the ubiquity, multisensoriality (or organicity), and 
instantaneous-interactive quality of communication.”191 Instead of 
looking at how existing legal rules may be adapted to cyberspace, 
Howes believes cyberspace will fundamentally change the law itself. 
For example, modern law has traditionally been text-based. “The 
doctrine of legal positivism is shown to derive from a text-based 
communications order. The legislative ideals associated with this 
doctrine, such as generality, promulgation, clarity and absence of 
contradiction, and top-down authority, all reflect the imprimatur of 
the printed text.”192 
On the other hand, “in pre- and post-typographic (i.e. oral and 
digital) communications orders, the predominant legislative values are 
flexibility, participation and accessibility, contextuality, and 
multicentric authority. These tenets are summed up by the notion of 
legal interactivism.”193 
What this could mean, in the context of e-legislating, is that more 
legislative decisions will be driven by multisensory data that is less 
normatively objective or statistical and more experientially based. 
	
190 Howes, supra note 186, at 42. Howes explains, 
Communication on the Internet will hence no longer be limited to disembodied, 
linear typed messages and responses but will consist of dynamic, multisensory 
interactions between “re-embodied” virtual beings. . . . With the success of user-
friendly software and Web sites, convenience has become another of the defining 
characteristics and thus one of the norms of Internet communication. . . . The 
advent of electronic communications has ushered in a new age of orality, for 
while electronic messages at present still primarily take written form, the 
interactive, dialogical character of Internet communication mimics the qualities 
of oral communication. . . . In an oral society the law is personal: it is always 
conveyed by one person to another, and hence never has the depersonalized 
objective character of a written text. 
Id. at 46, 48, 51, 54. 
191 Howes, supra note 186, at Preface. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
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2. Speed 
Many, including the Supreme Court, have acknowledged that “the 
Internet evolves at a rapid pace.”194 While this quote referred to the 
changes in electronic technologies, it also reflects the dynamic and 
instantaneous communication that the Internet now makes possible. 
The speed at which information is shared represents one of the 
unique attributes of the Internet. Thus, because of simultaneous 
Tweeting, speech is defined as it is in progress rather than viewed or 
digested in its entirety upon completion. This can fundamentally 
change the message the presenter intended, illustrated when Marco 
Rubio awkwardly lurched off screen to grab a drink of water during 
his rebuttal to President Obama’s 2013 State of the Union address. As 
comedian Stephen Colbert observed, “Don’t worry, Senator Rubio, 
nobody noticed—that you gave a speech.”195 
The fast, flexible, and sophisticated targeting that the Internet 
allows was critical in Revolution 2.0 and even more so in the Obama 
campaign. This agility empowers groups that might otherwise be 
outgunned to make more surgical and strategic strikes. This may 
prove pivotal in the context of e-legislating. In the past, only those 
with enough resources to have lobbyists covering the Capitol full-
time could have their voices heard during critical votes. Now, social 
media puts a broad public spotlight on everything that Congress is 
doing. 
Speed also has its drawbacks. “[T]he ‘tyranny of real-time’—
round-the-clock, round-the-world news and opinion from a multitude 
of sources . . . [is] putting pressure on slower, more deliberative 
governance processes.” Therefore, in the e-legislating context, it will 
be best if systems can be established “to react in Internet time and in 
the Internet space . . . to respond rapidly to (mis)information 
disseminated online.”196 Part IV below illustrates some of the 
problems when the Internet mobilizes mass action without providing 
full or accurate information. 
	
194 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 671 (2004). 
195 The Colbert Report (Comedy Central broadcast Feb. 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/423831/february-13-2013/state-of 
-the-rubio. 
196 DUTTON & PELTU, supra note 11, at 7 (quoting RICHARD GRANT, OXFORD 
INTERNET INSTITUTE, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING WITH THE 
INTERNET, 5 (2004)). 
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3. Quality 
Both citizen initiative and social media campaigns might be well-
intentioned and motivated by genuine concerns, but most often they 
are persuasive, rather than educational, and consequently rely on a 
certain degree of manipulation. As some scholars have noted in the 
context of e-rulemaking campaigns: 
[These campaigns use] techniques that rhetoricians and marketers 
have long used to motivate people to take a desired action: appeals 
to emotion and exploitation of fears and insecurities; hyperbolic, 
sometimes inflammatory, language and imagery; selective 
deployment of facts and strategic, sometimes misleading, 
juxtapositions or omissions of information.197 
In a citizen initiative campaign, those with money have a distinct 
advantage because they can bombard the airwaves with emotional and 
sometimes misleading ads.198 To counteract this, some governments 
have enacted reforms that require the dissemination of objective 
summaries of the ballot measures. In addition, these ballot pamphlets 
may allow proponents and opponents of an initiative equal 
opportunities to make their case for or against the measure. 
The relative lack of expense in mounting an Internet e-legislating 
campaign can be an equalizing and positive factor. This is significant 
because, unlike citizen initiatives and the election campaigns, which 
run in regular cycles, e-legislating requires daily diligence as 
measures move through Congress. The ability to mount social media 
campaigns on a daily basis also means they need more “pop” to catch 
our attention among the daily competing messages in our inboxes. 
Unfortunately for citizens who want to make an informed choice, 
these campaigns also do not have neutral forums, like the ballot 
pamphlet, to allow balanced presentation of both sides. Furthermore, 
social media campaigns have little incentive to provide their targets 
with follow-up links to find more balanced or complete coverage of 
the issues. Consequently, even if citizens want to know more, it can 
be very time consuming and challenging for them to find more 
comprehensive information to make informed choices. 
The effort to have campaigns stand out can lead to 
oversimplification of complex issues.199 Citizen initiatives may 
	
197 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 141–42. 
198 K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation:A 
Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 245–46 (2005). 
199 Oversimplification might be appropriate in the Joseph Kony situation. Beth Rowen, 
The World’s Most-Wanted Fugitives, INFOPLEASE, http://infoplease.com/world/statistics 
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include pages of graduate-level language,200 but the campaigns 
reduce those issues to sound bites and slogans, and the citizen’s 
choice is ultimately a simple “yes” or “no.” Similarly, social media 
campaign messages must fit on a webpage or within the 140 
characters of a Tweet. 
The oversimplification of complex issues into “starkly us-or-them, 
all-or-nothing terms”201 to encourage mass action has resulted in 
bizarre outcomes. Lack of citizen education about the issues upon 
which they are voting and misleading language has influenced 
citizens to vote contrary to their intent. Voters can “substitute voting 
cues for substantive policy knowledge,” which can result in decisions 
that are not always “welfare-improving.”202 
While this section focused on the information citizens receive in e-
legislating campaigns, the following will address citizen responses to 
that information. 
D. Type & Quality of Citizen Response 
“[L]ow-threshold civic engagement”203 
Some applaud virtual public participation as a positive trend—a 
signal that individuals are turning away from their personal needs, 
	
/most-wanted-fugitives.html (last visited July 13, 2013). The International Criminal 
Court’s designation of Kony as the most wanted war criminal provided independent 
verification that action against him is just. However, other issues arguably have less 
obvious villains. For example, the Keystone XL pipeline is controversial, but stopping the 
exportation of the tar sand oils to the United States will not prevent Canada from exporting 
the oil to China instead. Did Obama Push Canada into China’s Arms by Rejecting the 
Keystone Pipeline?, THE WEEK, (July 25, 2012), http://theweek.com/article/index/231023 
/did-obama-push-canada-into-chinas-arms-by-rejecting-the-keystone-pipeline. 
200 MAGLEBY, supra note 108. 
201 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 141–42. 
202 Craig M. Burnett, Elizabeth Garrett & Matthew D. McCubbins, The Dilemma of 
Direct Democracy, 9 ELECTION L.J. 305, 305 (2010). Here is a specific example: In an 
effort that seemed designed to confuse voters, Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) introduced a 
ballot initiative in 1988 to defeat a competing initiative it opposed, Proposition O, which 
would bar Oxy’s drilling beneath a coastal community near Los Angeles. Occidental’s 
competing initiative, Proposition P, permitted Oxy’s coastal drilling, but was marketed as 
opposing offshore drilling. Proposition O passed with 52.3% of the vote; Proposition P 
failed with only 34.2% of the vote. Tedd Vollmer & Tracy Wood, Anti-Drilling Prop. O 
Wins as Prop. P Loses, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1988, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-11-09 
/news/mn-444_1_drilling-project. 
203 Bill Sherman, Your Mayor, Your “Friend”: Public Officials, Social Networking, 
and the Unmapped New Public Square, 31 PACE L. REV. 95, 102 (2011) (addressing local 
government restrictions on social networking and fears of violating campaign finance, 
open meeting, FOI, and government ethics laws). 
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even if briefly, to attempt a measure of altruism or personal 
responsibility. At least one study showed that Internet “information 
exchange” correlated positively with “life contentment” in contrast to 
Internet “social recreation,” which correlated negatively.204 Sadly, the 
same study found that the increased political engagement fostered by 
online political discussions did not correlate to “increased levels of 
political knowledge” 205: 
The fundamentals of democracy assume a knowledgeable public, 
one that is capable of representing its own self-interest effectively. 
A healthy democracy, then, should see tandem movement between 
political knowledge and political participation. Here we find that 
while online group membership predicts increased levels of offline 
political participation, we do not see an equally significant effect on 
the levels of political knowledge.206 
When the authors examined the social media wall posts in the 
study database, they found most of the posts to be opinionated, 
incoherent, or lacking support. These posts were low quality, 
reinforcing existing prejudices, and exposing group members to little 
new, well-articulated, enlightening, or educational information.207 
These findings are consistent with others who have concluded that: 
[I]dealists hoping that social networks would enable a high-minded 
process of deliberative democracy are likely to be disappointed—
	
204 Jessica T. Feezell, Meredith Conroy & Mario Guerrero, Facebook is. . .Fostering 
Political Engagement: A Study of Online Social Networking Groups and Offline 
Participation, Presentation at the American Political Science Association Meeting 3 
(2009) (citing D.V. Shah, N. Kwak & Holbert 2001 for the conclusions about contentment, 
etc.). A study of 790 randomly selected wall posts by 455 undergraduate students at a 
public university in California  (nearly seventy percent of which declared Political Science 
as their major) to assess the quality of online political discussion groups and the effects on 
political engagement found the following: 
1) Online groups encourage offline political participation—this result is 
consistent with a 2008 study that also showed the chat rooms, political email 
correspondence, and online news exposure predict higher voting rates; and 
2) “[I]ncreased online political group membership . . . [has] not increased levels 
of political knowledge.” 
Id. at 3–5. 
205 Feezell, supra note 204, at 9, 16. A study of eParticipation in the EU also concluded 
that two key obstacles encountered included (1) “lack of awareness and information for the 
citizens about what is being decided” and (2) lack of the necessary “expertise and 
knowledge sophistication often required to make a contribution to arguments.” Thanassis 
Chrissafis & Mechthild Rohen, European eParticipation Developments: From Ad Hoc 
Experiences Towards Mass Scale Engagement, 2 EJOURNAL EDEMOCRACY & OPEN 
GOV’T 89, 91–92 (2010). 
206 Feezell, supra note 204, at 15–16. 
207 Id. 
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after all, study after study has demonstrated that online discourse is 
factually unreliable, consists of opinion rather than objective 
information, creates “echo chambers” in which people only talk to 
or hear from those who already agree with them, and therefore 
reinforce polarization in politics.208 
Assuming that citizens would take the time if a proper online 
forum were created, some argue that politicians and public officials 
can facilitate civil discussions and debates by establishing public 
online spaces and the rules by which they are moderated, just as all 
other democratic forums have been governed by rules of order. These 
forums might serve a function similar to the balanced or neutral ballot 
pamphlets created for citizen initiated measures. The tricky part 
would be structuring and monitoring discussions to avoid “sabotage 
and distort[ion]” and “to defuse flare-ups and disruptions.”209 
Others place blame for the decrease in political knowledge not on 
those disseminating the information but upon the lack of “cognitive 
investment”210 of those gathering it. In an e-electioneering context, 
research shows that voters have little incentive to invest the time to 
conduct sufficient research to choose candidates for office who reflect 
their preferences on pivotal issues.211 Any type of public participation 
is valued in electoral democracy as “[v]oters are asked for outcomes, 
not reasons.”212 Consequently, some studies have concluded that an 
	
208 Sherman, supra note 203, at 102 (quoting SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, supra note 
32, at 25); DUTTON & PELTU, supra note 11, at 21 (“Unregulated forums tend to become 
boxing rings for the extremes of an argument.”). 
209 DUTTON & PELTU, supra note 11, at 21 (suggesting the stage at which online 
consultation takes place—saying e-petitions are most appropriate for highlighting issues 
not yet widely debated). Also, “web design tools . . . include advice to citizens on how to 
engage with government officials in non-abusive ways, while clearly making the points 
they wish to raise.” Id. at 22. 
210 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 135. “[T]he participatory model of 
electoral democracy contains fewer incentives for citizens to make the cognitive 
investment needed to form higher information or higher thought preferences. The result, as 
voting research repeatedly shows, is that many voters are unaware of, or mistaken about, 
the record and positions of candidates for major office even on policy issues that they 
identify as important.” Id. These political outcomes are legitimate because there is no 
remedy to challenge them. Id. at 136; see also MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT 
KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 263–64 
(1997); MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS: 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF THE 1980S, at 124–26 (1992); Kate Kenski & Kathleen Hall 
Jamieson, Issue Knowledge and Perceptions of Agreement in the 2004 Presidential 
General Election, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 243 (2006). 
211 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 135. 
212 Id. “Even if exit polls reveal widespread ignorance, misinformation, or mistake, the 
outcome is legitimate so long as ballots are freely cast by eligible voters.” Id. 
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average of twenty-five percent of voters makes the “wrong” 
choice.213 
But this “wrong choice” conclusion might be challenged. Citizens 
make their choices about representatives on the basis of a number of 
criteria other than on a candidate’s stance with respect to one or two 
issues. Arguably, voters’ choices with respect to citizen initiatives or 
e-legislating should more closely align with their preferences. 
However, even in the context of citizen initiatives, there is 
evidence of voter confusion. Despite single-subject restrictions,214 
much legislation is complex. Furthermore, choices can be confused 
when individuals also feel affiliation with a group. Interest groups and 
political parties are increasingly becoming involved with citizen 
initiatives and e-legislating campaigns.215 As citizens learn of 
endorsements of particular pieces of legislation, it becomes more 
likely that voters will base their decisions on group-framed 
preferences.216 
Social media decisions may be even more prone to a lack of 
cognitive investment because of two fundamental characteristics of 
digital communication: convenience and high speed. For example, the 
current modus operandi for many e-legislating campaigns is to send 
individuals a message—by link, e-mail, Facebook, Twitter, etc.—that 
includes a pre-composed form letter or comment.217 The recipient 
	
213 See, e.g., Richard R. Lau et al., An Exploration of Correct Voting in Recent U.S. 
Presidential Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 395, 396–97 (2008) (analyzing data from 1972 
through 2004 presidential elections, and defining a vote as “correct” if it was cast for the 
candidate whose expressed issue positions most closely matched the voter’s collection of 
expressed, weighted preferences). Lau et al. found that the proportion of “incorrect” votes 
averaged twenty-five percent of all voters and reached a highpoint of forty-nine percent in 
the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan; in several presidential elections, they concluded, the 
incidence and direction of incorrect voting affected the outcome. Id. at 401–02, 406. Cf. 
Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American 
Mind, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 15 (2005) (examining disconnect between voters’ knowledge of 
and expressed views about the increasing gap between rich and poor and their support for 
regressive Bush administration cuts in income and estate taxes). 
214 Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 803 (2006). 
215 K.K. DuVivier, Out of the Bottle: The Genie of Direct Democracy, 70 ALB. L. REV. 
1045, 1049–50 (2007) (noting that the parties have used the initiative process to boost 
turnout for candidates). 
216 Surprisingly, at least one study found that “better-informed voters . . . are no more 
likely to make reasoned decisions than those who are, by our measure, uninformed.” 
Burnett, Garrett & McCubbins, supra note 202, at 305. 
217 Some groups encourage personalization of the letters to give them more weight, but 
the vast number of identical submissions suggests that few take the time to do so. 
Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 130 (citing Stuart W. Shulman, The Case 
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need not read the letter before sending it to legislators or making a 
donation to a cause. 
Statistics show that virtual participation declines with any 
additional time or financial investment.218 So while some e-
legislating requests require the senders to input personal data, many 
make it easier by storing that data and requiring a single click on 
one’s electronic device to deliver a message to one’s representatives. 
Contrast this investment of time to what, in the past, required 
educating oneself on the issue enough to compose a letter, finding the 
proper address and a stamp, and traveling to a box or post office to 
get your letter into the mail. The current electronic activism is so easy 
and involves such a low-time-investment that it has been given the 
derogatory labels of “slacktivism”219 or “clicktivism.”220 
Consequently, some argue that those responding to electronic 
campaigns base their positions less on objective information or 
deliberation, and instead on decision-making that is either (1) 
“spontaneous,” meaning “rapid, low-thought extrapolations from the 
individual’s general knowledge, underlying value system, and 
worldview” or (2) “group-framed,” which are “based on information  
. . . provided by a group with which the individual feels 
affiliation.”221 
	
Against Mass E-mails: Perverse Incentives and Low Quality Public Participation in U.S. 
Federal Rulemaking, 1 POL’Y & INTERNET 23, 34, fig.4, 35 (2009)). 
218 Cameron Chapman, 10 Usability Tips Based on Research Studies, SIX REVISIONS 
(Sept. 15, 2010), http://sixrevisions.com/usabilityaccessibility/10-usability-tips-based-on   
-research-studies/. 
219 Technologically-assisted forms of public participation are sometimes referred to as 
“slacktivism,” a term used to “describe feel-good online activism that has zero political or 
social impact.” Evgeny Morozov, The Brave New World of Slacktivism, NET.EFFECT (May 
19, 2009), http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/19/the_brave_new_world_of 
_slacktivism. 
220 By “liking” an online messaging campaign through Facebook, or by clicking a link 
embedded in an e-mail from your favorite nonprofit organization, clicktivists do nothing 
more than express support of a cause or generate an identical copy of a letter that is then 
electronically disseminated. It is impossible to determine whether participants in digital 
activism actively enhanced their “carbon-copy” submissions to reflect their own personal 
concerns or impacts, or whether they were content to simply click on the link and submit 
the comments pre-generated for them. 
221 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 130. Farina first sets out a typology of 
public preferences based on how they are informed: (1) Spontaneous Preferences; (2) 
Group-Framed Preferences; (3) Informed Preferences—“based on exposure to, and 
consideration of, reasonably full and accurate factual information”; and (4) Adaptive 
Preferences—“informed preferences modified by an assessment of the larger socio-
political environment, legal and organizational constraints, and the claims of competing 
preferences [etc.] . . . [i.e.] what is workable over what is ideal.” Id. at 132–34. 
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Spontaneous or impulse-based decisions are especially susceptible 
to the emotion that online communication fosters, so some might feel 
that group-framed decision-making is more legitimate. When Alexis 
de Tocqueville toured the United States in the 18th century, he 
observed that Americans “ultimately look upon public association as 
the universal, or in a manner the sole means, which men can employ 
to accomplish the different purposes they may have in view. . . . The 
art of association then becomes, as I have said before, the mother of 
action, studied and applied by all.”222 Since that time, U.S. political 
engagement has frequently been spurred by group membership. 
In 2000, Robert Putnam observed a decline in offline groups—
paired by growth of online groups for civic engagement.223 A 
problem with this shift is that the anonymity of the Internet, as 
indicated in Part II.B above, can distort or hide a group’s true identity 
and mislead citizens to trust that group’s statements.224 Furthermore, 
as discussed in Part II.C above, the goal of e-legislating campaigns is 
to spur supporters into action. Because providing more balanced facts 
may be less effective in motivating members, there may be a tendency 
for some groups to oversimplify and to be inflammatory and selective 
in the short space they have for their messages. 
E. Impact 
“It’s a new day . . . . Brace yourselves.”225 
Few can argue that it is a bad thing to have citizens pay attention in 
a democracy—whether representative or direct. There is so much 
competition for our attention that it has become a praiseworthy event 
when someone turns away from sports team rankings or 
entertainment, even briefly, and becomes concerned with making a 
	
222 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 639 (1835) (Bantam Dell ed. 
2004). 
223 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2000). 
224 For example, The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, one of the most recognized 
adversaries of what was hoped to be the first offshore wind farm in the United States, Cape 
Wind, raised $11 million in 2006. Ninety percent of its funds were donated by Bill Koch 
and his wealthy friends, such as Paul Fireman of Reebok and Michael Egan, son to the 
founder of EMC Corp. Koch’s corporation, the Oxbow Corporation, makes over $3.7 
billion in sales annually through the sale of petroleum coke and coal mining. Bill Koch: 
The Dirty Money Behind Cape Wind Opposition, GREENPEACE, http://www.greenpeace 
.org/usa/Global/usa/binaries/2010/bill-koch-the-dirty-money-beh.pdf (last visited July 15, 
2013). 
225 Weisman, supra note 1 (quoting Senator Chris Dodd). 
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decision about world or local issues.226 E-legislating, like citizen 
initiatives, can stimulate interest and debate about policy issues, 
reduce apathy and alienation, and increase political participation.227 
One of the biggest questions is whether e-legislating will be any 
more effective than conventional grassroots lobbying campaigns. For 
any number of reasons—time, effort, a sense of not being effective—
U.S. citizens have participated less, rather than more, in President 
Obama’s past invitations for them to become part of the policy-
making process. For example, Candidate Obama received up to five 
million votes on some of the ideas submitted online before he became 
president,228 but when he tried similar participatory activities after he 
took office, the number of participants dropped to as low as two 
thousand.229 
Politicians must pay attention to e-electioneering campaigns 
because citizen actions can translate into real consequences. For 
example, politicians who ignore constituents can be voted out. 
Similarly, most citizen initiative votes result in legislation or 
amendment of the state constitution, which, in many cases, state 
legislators have no power to change. In contrast, citizen input through 
the process of e-legislating is not binding. So how does, or should, it 
impact members of Congress? Because this is a new question, this 
section starts by looking to the extensive scholarship about assessing 
the appropriate role for social media in the administrative e-
rulemaking context.230 It then looks at how e-legislating embodies 
some of the attributes of e-electioneering that might make legislators 
pay more attention to social media for e-legislating than they might in 
the e-rulemaking context. 
	
226 DuVivier, supra note 198, at 236–38. 
227 Id. at 236–38. See also Manabu Saeki, Direct Democracy Paradox: State Fiscal 
Policies in the United States and the Threat of Direct Initiatives, 23 REV. POL’Y RES. 915, 
915 (2006) (listing some of the benefits of initiatives and citing Dye, 2000 pp. 40–42 and 
Schmidt, 1989). 
228 Johnston, supra note 13, at 162. See BITTLE, HALLER & KADLEC, supra note 143; 
Lee, supra note 143. 
229 Johnston, supra note 13, at 162. 
230 This discussion addresses social media input in the “notice and comment” 
rulemaking process, which anticipates and mandates public input. Administrative 
agencies, alternatively, sometimes take on a quasi-judicial role that is meant to be a non-
political decision-making process similar to that of the courts. Many administrative land 
use decisions—like the Keystone Excel Pipeline or approval of land use plans—would fit 
in this quasi-judicial category (e.g., Interior Board of Land Appeals) unless NEPA or 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) public comment 
requirements are triggered. 
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In a 2011 article, Nina Mendelson argued that agencies receiving a 
high volume of comments “occasionally acknowledge the number of 
lay comments and the sentiments they express [but] they very rarely 
appear to give them any significant weight.”231 “Interviews with 
agency rule writers show that agencies do not value and often openly 
resent form letters.”232 This may not be surprising considering that in 
a March 2011 rulemaking on Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, for 
example, EPA employees had to process about 3000 public comments 
per day.233 However, the problem is worse than simply 
“systematically discounting [social media comments]”;234 sometimes 
mass and electronic form-letter comments are “derided by agency 
staff.”235 
Mendelson specifically advocates that agencies make more of an 
effort to be responsive, not only to technical comments, but also to 
“value-focused” or “value-laden” comments.236 Alternatively, she 
	
231 Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1363–64 (2011). 
232 Schlosberg et al., supra note 45, at 143. 
233 EPA Fact Sheet: Mercury and Air Toxic Standards–Adjustments from Proposal to 
Final, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/mats/pdfs/20111221MATS 
adjustmentsfs.pdf [hereinafter EPA Fact Sheet] (last visited July 15, 2013). The EPA 
claimed to have received over 900,000 public comments. Id. Considering nine-month 
comment period, the agency would have had to analyze an average of 100,000 comments 
each month or approximately 3,000 per day. See also Lindsay McNamara, Mercury and 
Air Toxics Standards (MATS) Series Part I: Overview, SIERRA CLUB: DELAWARE 
CHAPTER (Oct. 9, 2012), http://delaware.sierraclub.org/content/mercury-and-air-toxics      
-standards-mats-series-part-i-overview; News Releases from Headquarters: EPA Issues 
First National Standards for Mercury Pollution from Power Plants/ Historic ‘Mercury 
and Air Toxics Standards’ Meet 20-Year Old Requirement to Cut Dangerous Smokestack 
Emissions, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec. 21, 2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa 
/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac8525735900400c27/bd8b3f37edf5716d8525796d005dd0
86%21OpenDocument [hereinafter EPA News Release]. 
234 Mendelson, supra note 231, at 1346.  
235 Id. at 1363. Additionally, agencies frequently treat multiple postings through letters, 
postcards, or e-mails with little real engagement as evidenced by the lack of agency 
response to mass comments. Id. at 1343, 1363–64. Additionally, federal agencies should 
work with developers of social media to enhance processing capabilities. The same 
technology that negatively impacts timelines could help expedite the review process. 
Congress should direct funding toward research and development, partnering with social 
media developers, to develop technology that facilitates effective public participation. E-
rulemaking, the use of technology to help facilitate public participation in agency 
rulemaking, may “have the potential to enhance . . . public understanding of and 
involvement in rulemaking.” Id. 
236 The “value-focused” and “value-laden” terminology is Mendelson’s. Examples she 
provides include “whether reduced pollution is worth higher electricity bills or whether the 
risk presented by a convenient infant bath seat is tolerable.” Id. at 1371. These types of 
DUVIVIER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2013  12:07 PM 
2013] E-Legislating 59 
notes, “[A]gencies should more candidly and publicly acknowledge 
that participation in rulemaking can serve only a limited function.”237 
The second alternative—of relegating social media comments to a 
limited function—appears to be what Cynthia R. Farina and members 
of the Cornell eRulemaking Initiative advocate in a 2012 article.238 
Farina argues that this limited function approach is more in line with 
the goals of the administrative rulemaking process. Even if new 
interactive technologies, such as Web 2.0, will allow “democracy on 
steroids”239 to assist in processing tsunamis of rule comments, there 
are other reasons not to place much weight on the growing quantities 
of input. Farina argues, “Rulemaking is not supposed to be a 
plebiscite.”240 The rulemaking process is legitimate only if based on a 
“formally transparent process of reasoned [data-driven] 
deliberation.”241 
Mendelson anticipated this response by noting “agency officials 
may see themselves as operating in an atmosphere of rational, 
technocratic analysis.”242 Yet, Mendelson raised the issue that 
regulatory decisions are still “heavily value-laden, even when they 
also require deployment of scientific or other specialized 
knowledge.”243 
	
comments are contrasted to those that are “sophisticated” and “advance the most technical 
concerns.” Id. at 1362. 
237 Id. at 1346–47. 
238 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45. 
239 Id. at 128. 
240 Id. at 131 & n.37 (“Several scholars have expressed concern about e-rulemaking 
precisely because the kind of participation it evokes might push agencies towards 
plebiscitary decisionmaking.”). See, e.g., David Schlosberg & John S. Dryzek, Digital 
Democracy: Authentic or Virtual? 15 ORG. & ENV’T 332 (2002); Bill Funk, The Public 
Needs a Voice in Policy. But is Involving the Public in Rulemaking a Workable Idea? CPR 
BLOG (Apr. 13, 2010), http://progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=F74D5F86-B 
44E-2CBB-ED1507624B63809E; cf. Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of 
Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173 
(1997) (examining problems in administrative contexts beyond rulemaking). 
241 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 135. 
242 Mendelson, supra note 231, at 1371. 
243 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45 (Farina commenting on Mendelson’s 
point), at 132; see also Mendelson, supra note 231, at 1371; Emily Hammond Meazell, 
Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency 
Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 736 (2011); Stephen Zavestoski, Stuart W. Shulman & 
David Schlosberg, Democracy and the Environment on the Internet: Electronic Citizen 
Participation in Regulatory Rulemaking, 31 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 383 (2006); 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 
461–68 (2005). 
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The remedy that the system has provided for challenging 
administrative decisions reflects normative weighting of priorities.244 
In the rulemaking context, a decision can be changed on judicial 
review, but based on limited criteria only.245 “Peter Strauss has 
written compellingly of the importance of the culture of 
administrative legality, whose norms impel those who write the rules 
(and ultimately those who defend them in court) to justify regulatory 
outcomes on more than bare political preference.”246 Farina goes on 
	
244 Mendelson acknowledges: 
[J]udicial review requirements provide agencies with an incentive to take 
technical comments more seriously than value-focused comments. . . . [I]n 
applying the arbitrary and capricious review standard, judges often focus 
explicitly on the rational connection between the “facts found” and the “choices 
made” by an agency in rulemaking. Consequently, an agency’s failure to 
acknowledge these sorts of issues may be vacated on judicial review. . . . 
[E]fforts to argue that agencies are obligated to follow the weight of preferences 
in the comments have been roundly—and appropriately—rejected, as with one 
opinion, where the court wrote that agency rulemaking is not a process in which 
“the majority of commenters prevail by sheer weight of numbers.” 
Mendelson, supra note 231, at 1370. 
245 Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). The APA 
states:  
The reviewing court shall— 
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and 
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
 found to be— 
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
 accordance with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short 
 of statutory right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 
 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an 
 agency hearing provided by statute; or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to 
 trial de novo by the reviewing court. 
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record 
or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error. 
Id. § 706 (1), (2)(A)–(F). 
246 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 139 (citing Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, 
or “The Decider”?: The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 
(2007)). 
DUVIVIER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2013  12:07 PM 
2013] E-Legislating 61 
to explain that “[r]easoned decisionmaking requires technocratic 
rationality” and not electoral democracy.247 
So how does this analysis translate to e-legislating? As with e-
rulemaking, the citizen comments in the e-legislating context are not 
binding votes. In fact, legislators often cannot tell if they are receiving 
a distorted sampling of public interest. In elections, whether for 
representatives or for a citizen initiative issue, the one-voter-one-vote 
rule prevails. In the contexts that social media is currently used—such 
as lobbying or rulemaking—there is rarely, if ever, any restriction on 
voting multiple times. 
All evidence indicates that multiple voting is prevalent in social 
media campaigns. Some multiple voting may be unintentional. 
Because of different solicitations from different sources, it is possible 
that one person will sign a petition or send the same letter multiple 
times. 
Other instances of multiple voting are deliberate. In a 2009 study, 
Stuart Shulman coined the term “plebers” in order to “describe 
commenters who are contributing to the plebiscitary notion of 
electronic rulemaking by sending two or more e-mails.”248 In some of 
Shulman’s studies, plebers accounted for more than half of the total 
comments received. Furthermore, Shulman’s work identified a few 
“Super-Plebers” who submitted more than 100 comments from a 
single e-mail address.249 Unless there is some way to distinguish 
input from single individuals as opposed to input from plebers, any 
conclusions based on the number of electronic messages from an e-
democracy campaign must be suspect.250 
	
247 Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 139. Farina’s recommendations 
include three principles: 
   Principle 1: No Bread and Circuses—do “not actively facilitate public participation 
that [the government] does not value.” Id. at 150. 
   Principle 2: Abandon the Equal Treatment Norm—tailor information to different 
participant needs. Id. at 156–58. 
   Principle 3: Means Should Change; Ends Should Not—do not make participation 
too easy. “[L]owest common-denominator participation system design” should not 
be the goal. Id. at 160–61. 
248 Shulman, supra note 45, at 35. 
249 Id. at 35–36. One pleber sent the same comment 314 times. Id. at 36. 
250 As noted above, confusion about the content might also make the results suspect. 
Because of errors, it may not effectively “gauge . . . citizen value preferences.” 
Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 142. “A reasonable agency, in short, would 
assume that mass comments suffer from the kinds of fundamental defects in information 
quality and deliberative judgment that would (justifiably) prompt judicial reversal were 
such flaws found in its own decisionmaking.” Id. at 143. 
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Whether it is because of the possibility of multiple voting or simply 
because of other social media characteristics, initial empirical data 
shows that legislators, just like administrative agencies, tend to 
discount high volumes of social media comments in the legislating 
context. Yet the basis for the screening process is different. Agency 
decision-making is structured to be objective, so it is arguably 
reasonable to filter out “value-laden” input. In contrast, legislating is 
more like e-electioneering. These choices reflect a society’s values, so 
legislators may have more of an obligation than an administrative 
agency to respond to citizen input on values. Large numbers of 
comments can reflect the intensity of those values. 
Furthermore, legislators are more politically attuned to the risks of 
ignoring mass public input if they are subject to reelection. If they 
fear political consequences, they are more likely than agency 
personnel to respond at least in some fashion.251 This means e-
legislating may have the potential to shift balances from those with 
power and money to those with little of either, from large 
corporations to non-profit groups, and from the entrenched few to the 
many.252 
But legislator responses are calculated. For example, empirical data 
shows that legislators give different weight to emails from different 
groups—placing higher value on input from constituents than from 
interest groups.253 Furthermore, in contrast to the threat of an 
immediate election in the e-electioneering context, legislators may be 
more willing to take the risk of ignoring the desires of constituents 
who are not large donors in the context of e-legislating because the 
consequences are more remote. 
Finally, Organizing for Action has not limited its efforts to 
electronic communications with Congress. Instead, social media has 
opened up the possibility of flash mobs and demonstrations to create 
	
251 In saying that some agency personnel deride mass comments, Cuéllar is talking 
about letters to agencies, which do not always give form letters the same weight as an 
individualized letter. Cuéllar, supra note 243, at 421–22. In contrast, legislators are more 
likely to take note of a high volume of letters, which could “entice legislators” to rebuke 
the agency and force the agency to reconsider the rule. Id. 
252 Emily Flynn Vencat, The Big Power Shift, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 28, 2007, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/01/28/the-big-power-shift.html (noting 
how the World Economic Forum in Davos focused less on the geographical power shift 
from West to East, but more on how the digital revolution is shifting power from 
traditional institutions and the domains of nation-states and megacorporations into the 
hands of the masses). 
253 Lilliard E. Richardson, Jr. & Christopher A. Cooper, E-mail Communication and the 
Policy Process in the State Legislature, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 113, 126 (2006). 
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timely and focused political pressure. It is much easier to ignore 
thousands of protesters on the computer than it is to ignore thousands 
of protestors on the streets outside one’s office. 
IV 
E-LEGISLATING IN ACTION 
Although it may represent the first conversion of an e-
electioneering campaign morphing into an ongoing e-legislating 
campaign, Organizing for Action is not the first, or only, use of the 
Internet to influence legislating. A dramatic example of the 
phenomenon of e-legislating occurred approximately a year before 
Organizing for Action was created. In January of 2012, over 100,000 
websites254 participated in a protest against the proposed “Stop 
Online Piracy Act” (SOPA) in the House and the companion “Protect 
IP Act of 2011” (PIPA) in the Senate.255 The SOPA experience will 
be used here to illustrate how each of the five characteristics 
described in the previous section may play out in the context of e-
legislation. To some, the results may be inspiring, and to others, 
alarming. 
A. The SOPA Protest Chronology 
The SOPA bill, introduced by Republican Representative Lamar 
Smith in late October of 2011, was a complex, seventy-eight-page 
measure attempting to protect intellectual property rights by boosting 
enforcement, especially against foreign websites.256 The bill had 
broad support among prominent corporations, law firms, most major 
media companies, and businesses in America, including ABC, CBS, 
Comcast/NBC Universal, Capitol Records, the NFL, Time Warner, 
	
254 Leo Kelion, SOPA: Sites Go Dark as Part of Anti-Piracy Law Protests, BBC NEWS 
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16612628. Although only 7000 
sites went dark, 115,000 participated in the strikes in some way (45,000 of these were on 
Wordpress.com). The January 18 Blackout / Strike in Numbers and Screenshots, FIGHT 
FOR THE FUTURE, http://sopastrike.com/numbers/ (last visited July 15, 2013). 
255 Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter SOPA], 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.03261. The Senate had a 
companion bill with the full name of “Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic 
Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011” (PIPA). S. 968, 112th Cong. 
(2011). Because most of the press coverage used the SOPA acronym, this Article will do 
the same. 
256 SOPA, supra note 255. 
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3M, Adidas, Random House, and many others.257 Advocates of 
SOPA claimed that the bill would expand U.S. law enforcement to 
fight online trafficking of intellectual property. These curbs on 
counterfeiting and piracy were said to support 2.2 million jobs in the 
U.S. movie industry alone.258 
About two weeks after SOPA was introduced, web giants, 
including Google, Facebook, Twitter, PayPal, eBay, Mozilla, Yahoo, 
AOL, LinkedIn, and Zynga, (“SOPA opponents”) wrote Congress 
objecting that the bill would “pose a serious risk to our industry’s 
continued track record of innovation and job-creation”259 As is often 
the case for legislation between competing business interests, many of 
the SOPA opponents were web giants in their own right, such as 
Google and Facebook, and had “political muscle of their own, with 
in-house lobbying shops and trade associations just like traditional 
media’s.”260 Following the age-old legislative dance in Congress, the 
SOPA opponents had sponsors introduce an alternative bill, the 
Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act (OPEN 
Act).261 
But the opponents could see that their use of traditional lobbying 
tactics was faltering. SOPA appeared destined to pass. It had cleared a 
Senate committee and had bipartisan support in the House.262 In late 
	
257 For a complete list of the bill’s supporters, see David Harris-Gershon, THE LIST–
Every Corporation & Organization Supporting SOPA, Care of the House Judiciary 
Committee, DAILY KOS (Dec. 21, 2011, 4:45 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011 
/12/21/1047747/-THE-LIST-Every-Corporation-Organization-Supporting-SOPA-Care-of  
-the-House-Judiciary-Committee. 
258 Jim Puzzanghera, PIPA Anti-Piracy Bill Vote Postponed in Senate, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 
20, 2012, 6:51 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2012/01/pipa-anti-piracy 
-bill-vote-postponed-senate.html. 
259 Mary Quinn O’Connor, Censoring Clicks or Saving the Web? SOPA Hearing May 
Shape Net’s Future, FOX NEWS (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2011/12 
/15/censoring-your-clicks-saving-web-sopa-hearing-may-shape-nets-future/#ixzz2LdeGa 
Xpk (quoting an Open Letter to Washington). 
260 Weisman, supra note 1. See also Christopher S. Stewart, Geoffrey A. Fowler & Sam 
Schechner, New, Old Media Battle Over Net Rules, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203735304577167331129343336.html  
(Former White House Press Secretary, Joe Lockhart, works for Facebook, and former 
counsel to John McCain, Pablo Chavez, for Google). 
261 Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, H.R. 3782, 112th Cong. 
(2012) [hereinafter The OPEN Act]. 
262 David A. Fahrenthold, SOPA Protests Shut Down Websites, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sopa-protests-to-shut-down-web-sites 
/2012/01/17/gIQA4WYl6P_story.html. 
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January, with a vote on the bill less than a week away,263 opponents 
mobilized the public through an e-legislating campaign. The plan for 
the campaign had been months in the hatching. Mark Zuckerberg, 
chief executive of Facebook, said, “The world today needs political 
leaders who are pro-Internet. We have been working with many of 
these folks for months on better alternatives to these current 
proposals.”264 
First, the opponents posted information on their websites alerting 
users to their concerns about SOPA. One site, Tumblr, hosted a “Stop 
Censorship” day and helped generate over 87,000 phone calls to U.S. 
Representatives on a single day.265 But no legislators were yet 
abandoning the bill, and SOPA was scheduled to go for a vote. 
So then, the SOPA opponents rolled out their “Nuclear Option,”266 
a coordinated blackout on January 18, 2012. Jimmy Wales, the 
founder of Wikipedia, threatened the blackout over a month ahead 
saying: 
Right now, what I’m thinking is that if there is credible threat that 
[SOPA might pass], this [blackout] could have a positive impact on 
the thinking of some legislators . . . . Do not underestimate our 
power—in my opinion, they are terrified of a public uprising about 
this, and we are uniquely positioned to start that.267 
The story illustrates the Internet’s agility, as vast numbers of 
supporters of the SOPA opponents responded worldwide to the 
protest.268 Wikipedia, the sixth largest website in the United States269 
	
263 Paul Kane, SOPA, PIPA Votes to be Delayed in House and Senate, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 20, 2012 11:16 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/sopa     
-senate-vote-to-be-delayed-reid-announces/2012/01/20/gIQApRWVDQ_blog.html. 
264 Jenna Wortham, With Twitter, Blackouts and Demonstrations, Web Flexes Its 
Muscle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/technology 
/protests-of-antipiracy-bills-unite-web.html?_r=1&. 
265 TUMBLR STAFF BLOG (Nov. 17, 2011), http://staff.tumblr.com/post/12930076128/a 
-historic-thing. November 16, 2011 was dubbed “American Censorship Day.” American 
Censorship Day, AMERICANCENSORSHIP.ORG, http://americancensorship.org/ (last visited 
July 15, 2013). 
266 Declan McCullagh, SOPA Opponents May Go Nuclear and Other 2012 Predictions, 
CNET.COM (Dec. 29, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-57349540-281 
/sopa-opponents-may-go-nuclear-and-other-2012-predictions/. 
267 Christopher Williams, Wikipedia Co-Founder Threatens Blackout Over Anti-Piracy 
Law, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 13, 2011, 11:58 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology 
/jimmy-wales/8953273/Wikipedia-co-founder-threatens-blackout-over-anti-piracy-law 
.html. 
268 A few objectors resorted to old-fashioned letter writing, including an open letter to 
Congress from several well-known artists and performers. An Open Letter to Washington 
from Artists and Creators, Jan. 17, 2012, available at http://www.stopthewall.us/artists/. 
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with twenty-five million visitors on a typical day,270 completely 
blacked out its English service. The landing page simply directed its 
users to contact their representatives to protest SOPA. Over 160 
million people viewed Wikipedia’s banner.271 Reddit and an 
estimated 7000 smaller websites also joined in the service 
blackout.272 
While other websites did not completely deny service, many, such 
as Google, Yahoo, Facebook, and Twitter, used their online platforms 
to spread warnings and disseminate protest plans. The results were 
dramatic: ten million petition signatures were collected, eight million 
phone calls were attempted,273 and four million emails were sent.274  
Google, which had the widest reach with 153.4 million site visits each 
month in 2011,275 alone collected over seven million signatures.276 
And yes, this e-legislating campaign had impact even though 
members of Congress may not have known how many of these 
millions of responses were from plebers or international interests 
rather than from their constituents. In a dramatic turnaround, 
members of Congress, including some of the initial sponsors, shelved 
SOPA and PIPA indefinitely.277 At the beginning of the day, the odds 
	
269 Bill Killed: SOPA Death Celebrated as Congress Recalls Anti-Piracy Acts, RT.COM 
(Jan. 20, 2012, 9:33 PM), http://rt.com/news/sopa-postponed-anonymous-piracy-337/. 
270 Jimmy Wales, @JIMMY_WALES (Jan. 16, 2012, 9:18 AM), available at How Many 
People Saw the SOPA Blackout?, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2012, 11:03 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21005042/2012/01/web-statistics.?page=2. 
271 Jimmy Wales, supra note 270. 
272 The January 18 Blackout / Strike, supra note 254. 
273 Demand was so heavy that the switchboard went down and calls could not be 
completed. Wortham, supra note 264. 
274 The January 18 Blackout / Strike, supra note 254. Some groups even resorted to 
guerilla warfare tactics. After a government crackdown on the website Megaupload, which 
hosts up to fifty million users a day, a “hacktivist” Internet group known as Anonymous 
waged online attacks against several SOPA proponents, including the Department of 
Justice, the RIAA, and Warner Music. Anonymous allegedly hacked their websites and 
shut them down for extended periods. Philiana Ng, Hacktivist Group Anonymous Takes 
Down Government, Music Industry Websites, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 19, 2012, 
4:24 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/megaupload-anonymous-mpaa-riaa    
-Websites-hacked-283427. 
275 Brandon Russell, Google Amassed 153.4 Million U.S. Visitors Per Month in 2011, 
TECHNOBUFFALO (Dec. 28, 2011), www.technobuffalo.com/2011/12/28/google-amassed  
-153-4-million-u-s-visitors-per-month-in-2011. 
276 Bill Killed, supra note 269. Electronic Frontier Foundation, a U.S.-based 
international digital rights advocacy nonprofit also claims it sent over 1 million e-mails on 
January 18. Id. 
277 Alan Fram, Web World Surprised by Political Victory on Anti-Piracy Bills, DENVER 
POST (Jan. 22, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_19792107. See also 
Jim Puzzanghera, SOPA Blackout: Bills Lose Three Co-Sponsors Amid Protests, L.A. 
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in favor of passing the bill were two to one; by the end of the day, 
almost every representative was aligned against it.278 
As lawmakers fled from the bill in response to the backlash, SOPA 
sponsor Representative Lamar Smith announced that any vote on the 
bill would be delayed until they could reach a broader consensus.279 
“I have heard from the critics and I take seriously their concerns . . . . 
It is clear that we need to revisit the approach,” Smith explained.280 
As of this writing more than a year later, Congress has still not 
entertained any similar legislation. 
B. The SOPA Protest in Light of the Five E-Legislating 
Characteristics 
This section will address each of the distinguishing characteristics 
of e-legislating from Part III above in the context of the SOPA 
protest. 
1. Size and Geographic Scope of the Internet 
The SOPA protest illustrates the dramatic numbers that Internet 
campaigns can generate. When the petition signatures, phone calls, 
and emails were all tallied, the number of responses exceeded twenty-
two million. This volume of virtual participants was overwhelming in 
comparison to conventional citizen lobbying efforts—the switchboard 
in Congress temporarily shut down from the overload. The next day, 
Jimmy Wales of Wikipedia tweeted that “162 million worldwide saw 
	
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012, 10:19 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2012/01 
/sopa-blackout-sopa-and-pipa-lose-three-co-sponsors-in-congress.html. Senator Marco 
Rubio posted his decision to withdraw his support on his Facebook page, explaining, 
“[W]e’ve heard legitimate concerns about the impact the bill could have on access to the 
Internet and about a potentially unreasonable expansion of the federal government’s power 
to impact the Internet. Congress should listen and avoid rushing through a bill that could 
have many unintended consequences.” Senator Marco Rubio, A Better Way to Fight the 
Online Theft of American Ideas and Jobs, FACEBOOK (Jan. 18, 2012, 6:33 AM), 
https://www.facebook.com/SenatorMarcoRubio/posts/340889625936408. 
278 “By the end of the day, we had a huge swing in Congress . . . .” Bill Killed, supra 
note 269. Electronic Frontier Foundation, a U.S.-based, international digital rights 
advocacy nonprofit, claims to have sent over one million emails on January 18. See 
Weisman, supra note 1. 
279 Puzzanghera, supra note 258. 
280 Roger Yu, Congress Shelves Anti-Piracy Bills, USA TODAY (Jan. 20, 2012, 2:38 
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-01-20/anti-piracy-bills-halted 
/52698192/1. 
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the blackout page.”281 According to Wales, only eight million of the 
162 who viewed the page looked up congressional phone numbers. 
This could mean that others who signed petitions or sent emails were 
not American voters. In addition, there are no figures about how 
many of the twenty-two million responses might have been from 
plebers or super-plebers who submitted multiple responses from a 
single email address. 
2. Aspects of Internet Speakers 
It was easy to join the SOPA protest. The 100,000 websites that did 
could unilaterally make the decision because they controlled the 
platforms. Access was also cheap for them. Aside from the possible 
loss of advertising revenue, they did not have to pay anything to 
disperse their messages. They essentially enlisted their viewers as free 
lobbyists. 
While the entities urging the protests were known to their viewers, 
anonymity could have played a role in the responses sent to Congress. 
The Internet vehicle shields anyone who may have used fictitious 
names from negative consequences. Further, there is no one-person-
one-vote restriction to prevent those who responded from submitting 
multiple messages. 
3. Type, Speed, and Quality of Information Received 
The SOPA protest illustrates the alacrity of the Internet. The SOPA 
opponents were able to get their message out, to awaken their 
followers to act, and to alarm legislators sufficiently to persuade them 
to abandon the bill—all in a single day. 
As with most lobbying information found on the Internet, the 
quality of many of the messages on the day of the blackout was one-
sided and inflammatory. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
describe what each of the 100,000 websites that participated 
displayed, but Wikipedia’s was one that had some of the broadest 
reach. That webpage read: “Imagine a World Without Free 
Knowledge . . . . Right now, the U.S. Congress is considering 
legislation that could fatally damage the free and open Internet.”282 
Although it is difficult to find multisensory videos of legislation, 
the visual images the SOPA opponents posted helped achieve their 
	
281 Jimmy Wales, @JIMMY_WALES (Jan. 19, 2012, 12:54 AM), available at How Many 
People Saw the SOPA Blackout?, supra note 270. 
282 The January 18 Blackout / Strike, supra note 254. 
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goal of invoking both fear and resentment. Wikipedia’s website 
featured a colorless image casting long, potentially ominous, 
shadows.283 Google’s site and others posted large sections of redacted 
words and spaces, and yet others stamped “Censored” across the 
screen. 
SOPA supporters countered, “The bill will not harm Wikipedia, 
domestic blogs or social networking sites. This publicity stunt does a 
disservice to its users by promoting fear instead of facts. Perhaps 
during the blackout, Internet users can look elsewhere for an accurate 
definition of online piracy.”284 But these SOPA supporters needed to 
make their points through traditional media because they did not have 
access to Internet sources. 
This illustrates an especially troubling aspect of the blackout: 
SOPA opponents controlled access to information that citizens needed 
to make an informed choice about the legislation. Major media and 
entertainment companies who supported SOPA could not get their 
message out. Critics complained that “[i]t’s very difficult to counter 
the misinformation when the disseminators also own the platform”285 
and that “[i]t is ironic that a website dedicated to providing 
information is spreading misinformation about the Stop Online Piracy 
Act.”286 
Google, Wikipedia, and many of the other websites that 
participated are known for providing information, but on the day of 
the protest, the quality of the messages from the SOPA opponents was 
persuasive, not objective. They had tried earlier to educate and to 
provide more specifics about the bill, but the choice had not been dire 
or clear enough to exhort their followers into action. This time, the 
message was clear. A caption beneath the black banner across 
Google’s page said, “Tell Congress: Please don’t censor the web!”287 
	
283 Protests Against SOPA and PIPA, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/Wikipedia_blackout (last visited July 16, 2013). 
284 Brendan Sasso, Sponsor of Online Piracy Bill Calls Wikipedia Blackout a 
“Publicity Stunt,” HILLICON VALLEY (Jan. 17, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs 
/hillicon-valley/technology/204629-gop-chairman-wikipedia-blackout-a-publicity-stunt 
#ixzz2LDWlSjvS (quoting SOPA sponsor Lamar Smith). 
285 Wortham, supra note 264 (quoting Cary H. Sherman, chairman and chief executive 
of the Recording Industry Association of America, a trade group that represents the United 
States music industry, referring to Google and Facebook). 
286 Sasso, supra note 284. 
287 Fahrenthold, supra note 262. 
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4. Type and Quality of Citizen Response 
Some applauded the SOPA e-legislating campaign as a victory for 
the people. “I think it is an important moment in the Capitol. . . . Too 
often, legislation is about competing business interests. This is way 
beyond that. This is individual citizens rising up.”288 Others saw it as 
the web opponents exercising their right to free speech, or something 
akin to a union strike.289 
Yet, still more saw it as a masterful lobbying strategy on the part of 
the SOPA opponents: 
It culminates a surprising lobbying effort in which technology 
companies such as Twitter, Wikipedia and Google have used their 
massive reach into Americans’ daily lives as a political weapon, to 
whip up support from online users. . . . In back offices of the 
Senate, many longtime aides were amazed at how quickly a new 
lobbying force had managed to outmaneuver experienced 
heavyweights.290 
SOPA did represent a battle of heavyweights—large media and 
manufacturing companies against large web companies. Each side 
had the money and firepower to play the traditional lobbying game in 
Congress. The “old economy” mustered “campaign contributions, 
Washington parties and high-priced lobbyists,” but “nothing could 
compare to the tentacles the new economy [could] reach into 
Americans’ everyday lives through sites like Wikipedia.”291 
The suggestion that the SOPA battle was just an extension of 
lobbying-as-usual may tarnish the David v. Goliath image of e-
legislating. Were Internet users just another unpaid arm of the web 
opponents’ lobbying efforts when their traditional paid lobbyists had 
failed? Were we just unwitting pawns in this battle of titans? This 
result would be consistent with early studies which found that “the 
Internet has not become a force for democratizing policy decisions . . 
. . In fact, there is preliminary evidence that the Internet is 
	
288 Weisman, supra note 1 (quoting Representative Zoe Lofgren, a Democrat from 
California who opposed the legislation). 
289 Melissa Bell, Web Strike Goes Back to the Future, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2012, at 
EZ5. See also Internet Goes on Strike, AMERICANCENSORSHIP.ORG, http://american 
censorship.org/modal/sopastrikeoverlay.html (last visited July 16, 2013). 
290 Fahrenthold, supra note 262. 
291 Weisman, supra note 1. 
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increasingly a tool of the powerful and entrenched rather than the new 
and reform-minded.”292 
Our Founders wanted a deliberative decision process for enacting 
legislation to encourage informed decision-making that adapted to 
competing constituent preferences or to legal and organizational 
constraints.293 There is no empirical data on what those who 
contacted their legislators were thinking on January 18, 2012. 
However, it was unlikely that even a fraction of the millions who 
contacted their legislators had read and fully understood the seventy-
eight-page SOPA bill. Nor is it likely that most of the responses were 
deliberative, informed, and adapted to competing preferences or 
constraints. 
It is possible that some read the posts of Zuckerberg and others294 
and were persuaded to contact their legislators because of group-
framed preferences. We might ask, however, why we should feel a 
closer affiliation with the SOPA opponent groups than with the 
traditional media proponents of SOPA who were trying to save 
American jobs by fighting counterfeiting and piracy. Considering the 
fear and outrage techniques described above, impulse may have been 
the primary motivating factor. 
Finally, and perhaps most sinisterly, the SOPA opponents had the 
ability to deprive users of their services as a means of motivating 
them to act politically. The question became “how to translate the 
inevitable confusion and outrage from those who don’t know what 
SOPA is into activism. . . . [There is] a great possibility to focus and 
direct that energy [due to people’s frustration about unavailability of 
social media] into productive activism against SOPA.”295 Thus, the 
Internet companies that opposed SOPA had a tool that few e-
legislating campaigns enjoy. By denying their viewers access, they 
opened up some of those viewers’ free time. They were then able to 
	
292 R. Karl Rethemeyer, Policymaking in the Age of Internet: Is the Internet Tending to 
Make Policy Networks More or Less Inclusive?, 17 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 259, 
279 (2006). 
293 See, e.g., Rulemaking vs. Democracy, supra note 45, at 134 (defining “informed 
preferences” as those “based on exposure to, and consideration of, reasonable full and 
accurate factual information” and “adaptive preferences,” meaning those that are 
“informed preferences modified by an assessment of the larger social-political 
environment, legal and organizational constraints, and the claims of competing 
preferences,” etc.—i.e., “what is workable over what is ideal”). 
294 Wortham, supra note 264 (quoting Mark Zuckerberg’s Facebook page). 
295 Graeme McMillan, SOPA: What if Google, Facebook and Twitter Went Offline in 
Protest?, TIME TECH (Jan. 5, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/01/05/sopa-what-if     
-google-facebook-and-twitter-went-offline-in-protest/. 
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divert that newfound time into activism that promoted the website’s 
political message. 
Does this deprivation to coerce political action violate any laws? 
The Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act prohibit persons from 
attempting to “threaten, intimidate, or coerce” another person for the 
purpose of interfering with that person’s right to vote or to vote as he 
or she may choose in an election.296 Threats to deprive former slaves 
of use of farms297 or threats to prevent a black man from entering 
property to conduct his job298 were both found to violate one of these 
acts. Courts have also found that baseless arrests and prosecutions of 
people for the purpose of denying them the right to vote or scaring 
them from registering also violate 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 and 1973.299 
Similarly, threatening to deprive employees of their jobs if they do 
not vote for a particular candidate is illegal under some state 
statutes.300 “About half of Americans live in jurisdictions that protect 
	
296 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973b (2012); Civil Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1971 (2012). To win a claim, a plaintiff must satisfy two requirements: (1) 
showing that there was an intimidation, threat, or coercion, or an attempt to intimidate, 
threaten or coerce, and (2) that the intimidation was for the purpose of interfering with the 
right to vote. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1967). 
297 United States v. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653, 654 (6th Cir. 1961). In United States v. Beaty, 
white landowners evicted or threatened to evict blacks of voting age from the farms where 
they lived and worked as sharecroppers as a means to punish or prevent blacks from 
registering to vote. The Court labeled the practice “economic strangulation” and held that 
it violated 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b)’s prohibition on “threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Id. at 
656. The court also noted the fact that the landowners’ “coercion relate[d] to land or 
contracts would furnish no excuse or defense.” Id. Note that Beaty deals with the Civil 
Rights Act, which is based on race, but the spirit and language of that act is sufficiently 
similar to the Voting Rights Act to translate to the VRA as well. Id. 
298 United States v. Bruce, 353 F.2d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 1965). The court in United 
States v. Bruce also dealt with exertions of power over a man’s profession as a means of 
improper coercion under § 1971. In Bruce, landowners denied a black man the right to 
enter their property, and in so doing prevented him from performing his job of collecting 
the money for their insurance policy premiums. The court held that, even though it is 
perfectly legal to exclude another from one’s private property, the exclusion was 
nevertheless illegal under § 1971 because the exclusion, which affected the man’s 
livelihood, was coercion for the purpose of interfering with his right to register to vote. Id. 
at 477; see also McLeod, 385 F.2d at 740 (“Acts otherwise entirely within the law may 
violate the statute if they have the proscribed effect and purpose.”). 
299 McLeod, 385 F.2d at 734; City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 847 (1966). 
300 Some state laws may prohibit companies taking action to influence how their 
employees vote. David A. Graham, Can Your Boss Threaten to Fire You if You Don’t Vote 
for Romney?, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 20, 2012 10:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com 
/politics/archive/2012/10/can-your-boss-threaten-to-fire-you-if-you-dont-vote-for-romney 
/263709/#. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE, § 1102 (West 2012) (“No employer shall coerce or 
influence or attempt to coerce or influence his employees through or by means of threat of 
discharge or loss of employment to adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or following 
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some private employee speech or political activity from employer 
retaliation.”301 However, if properly worded, such threats do not 
appear to violate federal law, which explains why several CEOs who 
made threats to their employees at Presidential Candidate Romney’s 
urging could do so without legal repercussions.302 
	
any particular course or line of political action or political activity.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 
260.665 (2012) (“(1) As used in this section, “undue influence” means force, violence, 
restraint or the threat of it, inflicting injury, damage, harm, loss of employment or other 
loss or the threat of it, or giving or promising to give money, employment or other thing of 
value. (2) A person, acting either alone or with or through any other person, may not 
directly or indirectly subject any person to undue influence with the intent to induce any 
person to: (a) register or vote; (d) be . . . a candidate; or (i) sign or refrain from signing a 
prospective petition or an initiative, referendum, [or] recall.”). 
301 Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political Activity: Statutory 
Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295, 297 (2012). 
302 During the 2012 campaign, Mitt Romney urged employers:  
I hope you make it very clear to your employees what you believe is in the best 
interest of your enterprise and therefore their job and their future in the upcoming 
elections . . . . Nothing illegal about you talking to your employees about what 
you believe is best for the business, because I think that will figure into their 
election decision, their voting decision and of course doing that with your family 
and your kids as well. 
Josh Voorhees, Romney Wants Small Business Owners to Tell Their Employees How They 
Should Vote, SLATE.COM (OCT. 18, 2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the 
_slatest/2012/10/18/romney_s_nfib_call_gop_hopeful_tells_employers_to_tell_employees
_who_to.html. Several employers followed up by threatening employees that their jobs 
would be on the line if Obama was reelected. Adam Peck, CEO Threatens Employees With 
‘Personal Consequences’ If Romney Loses, THINKPROGRESS.COM (Oct. 25, 2012, 1:35 
PM), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/10/25/1089891/ceo-consequences-romney 
/?mobile=nc; Alexis Kleinman, Nine CEOs Pushing Workers to Vote for Romney, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10 
/28/ceos-urge-employees-vote-romney_n_2018264.html; Larry Gold, associate general 
counsel of the AFL-CIO, opined that such threats crossed the line into improper coercion 
or intimidation of voters into voting a certain way. Steven Greenhouse, Here’s a Memo 
From the Boss: Vote This Way, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2012/10/27/us/politics/bosses-offering-timely-advice-how-to-vote.html?pagewanted=all 
&_r=0. 
 Larry Gold, associate general counsel of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., said some of the 
recent employer letters, by hinting at the possible loss of employees’ jobs, 
appeared to cross the line into improper coercion. Federal law and the laws of 
several states bar anyone from coercing or intimidating voters into voting a 
certain way. 
 But Bradley A. Smith, a Republican former member of the Federal Election 
Commission and a professor at Capital University Law School, disagreed, saying 
letters like those sent by the companies were not firm threats to fire anyone if Mr. 
Obama won. 
 . . . . 
 “The concern here is there is an unavoidable power disparity between 
management and employees,” said Adam Skaggs, senior counsel at the liberal 
Brennan Center for Justice. “Put yourself in the shoes of an employee at any of 
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It is unlikely that the deprivation of Internet services that SOPA 
opponents used on January 18, 2012, rises to the level of an illegal 
act. The Internet is not a necessary service, and the deprivation was 
not intended to influence voting in an election, which is the scope of 
the statutes. However, using deprivation to manipulate and motivate 
political action is disturbing. “Mr. Dodd said Internet companies 
might well change Washington, but not necessarily for the better with 
their ability to spread their message globally, without regulation or 
fact checking. ‘It’s a new day,’ he added. ‘Brace yourselves.’”303 
5. Impact 
Despite the emotion and inability to verify whether constituents or 
non-citizens were speaking, members of Congress were so 
overwhelmed by the one-day deluge of protests against SOPA that 
they fled from it in droves. Thus, this campaign proved that e-
legislating has the ability to stop legislation. The question remains 
whether it also can be effective as a constructive mechanism for the 
creation of laws. 
An often overlooked part of the SOPA blackout story is that the 
Internet protest translated to some actual physical turnout in San 
Francisco and New York. However, in comparison to the millions 
who responded online, the real-world turnout was relatively meager. 
About a thousand protestors flocked into Midtown Manhattan.304 But 
only around one hundred people showed up for a rally at City Hall in 
San Francisco.305 Another rally planned in Seattle was postponed due 
to rain.306 These numbers are paltry in comparison to those for the 
first Earth Day in 1970. Mayor John Lindsay shut down Fifth Avenue 
	
those companies. Are you going to be comfortable putting an Obama bumper 
sticker on your car and driving into the company parking lot? If you’re in a small 
community with a big employer, will you feel uncomfortable about putting up a 
yard sign for a candidate your boss doesn’t favor?” 
Id. 
303 Weisman, supra note 1. “Mr. Smith, the House Republican author, said opposition 
Web sites were spreading ‘fear rather than fact.’ ‘When the opposition is based upon 
misinformation, I have confidence in the facts and confidence that the facts will ultimately 
prevail,’ Mr. Smith said.” Id. 
304 Wortham, supra note 264. 
305 Sarah Mitroff, Silicon Valley Luminaries Protest SOPA in Downtown San 
Francisco, VBNEWS (Jan. 18, 2012, 2:39 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2012/01/18/sopa     
-san-francisco-protest/. 
306 Wortham, supra note 264. Stop SOPA in Seattle: Microsoft, Amazon, Geekwire, and 
a Rally, SEATTLE PI (Jan. 18, 2012), http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlewaterfronthomes 
/2012/01/18/stop-sopa-in-seattle-microsoft-amazon-geekwire-and-a-rally/. 
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as a crowd of approximately one million demonstrated in Central 
Park,307 and nationwide, an estimated twenty million participated in 
peaceful teach-ins to persuade politicians to enact substantial and 
lasting environmental legislation.308 
Although it may be true that “pressure works,”309 a virtual 
revolution may be confined to the virtual world until it generates 
some boots on the ground. It is easier for a legislator to ignore a 
virtual presence of one million electronic letters than a mob of one 
million angry constituents outside the office door. E-legislating may 
need to get people into the streets to be effective, but Revolution 2.0 
showed that social media may just be up to that task. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress can no longer escape the impact of e-legislating. Interest 
groups have recognized its potential and are engaged in an escalating 
arms race for virtual participants.310 Consequently, we must all 
become aware of e-legislating’s positive attributes and its drawbacks. 
E-legislating’s success in thwarting Congress’s efforts to pass the 
Stop Online Piracy Act provides a valuable illustration. 
The SOPA experience may have exaggerated the problems because 
of the players and the issue. Yet, it provides valuable lessons about 
the potential vulnerabilities of the e-legislating process in general. 
Most importantly, how can we avoid manipulation of average 
citizens? The SOPA opponents were in the unique position of being 
able both to create citizen outrage through deprivation and fear and to 
harness into lobbying action the additional time created by taking 
away Internet entertainment. In addition, the SOPA situation 
highlighted the ability of the Internet to allow the lightning-fast 
spread of misinformation, while corrections never receive the same 
penetration or coverage.311 
	
307 See EPA History: Earth Day, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-earth 
-day (last updated June 19, 2013). 
308 EARTH DAYS (PBS television broadcast, Zeitgeist Films 2010), available at 
http://video.pbs.org/video/1463378089/. See also ENVIROLINK, http://earthday.envirolink 
.org/history.html (last visited July 17, 2013). 
309 Rachel Maddow Show (NBC television broadcast Jan. 30, 2013) (discussing 
Organizing for Action). 
310 Fred Emery & Andrew Emery, A Modest Proposal: Improve E-Rulemaking by 
Improving Comments, 31 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 8 (2005) (referring to a “rulemaking 
arms race”). 
311 Jon Stewart mocked how little coverage studies reaffirming climate change by 
previous skeptics received compared to that of the McDonald’s McRib sandwich on The 
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Furthermore, the SOPA experience illustrated only the ability of e-
legislating to stop congressional action. It does not illustrate success 
in achieving positive action—actually getting statutes enacted. Vested 
interests have always screamed the loudest when opposing change, so 
does e-legislating just give these interests a larger megaphone? Or can 
the virtual pressure translate to a true turnout of activists as in Egypt? 
The flexibility and speed of the Internet allow more close monitoring 
of Congress so average citizens can respond at critical times in the 
legislative process. But how can we keep people focused to carry 
through and maintain pressure at every stage of what our Founders 
intentionally created as a complex, deliberative legislative process? 
This may be the challenge of our time. Can we be persistent as the 
process requires, or does the quick and fleeting attention span of the 
Internet make this especially challenging? 
E-legislating has the potential for leveling the playing field for 
average citizens who have in the past been competing with privileged 
interests who can afford full-time lobbyists. If we can harness this 
positive change, then the “new day” in Washington will be a sunny 
one. 
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